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No. 1265

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CONTENTS

PAGE

Naval Training Activities: Morale, Moral Training, Attitudes (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, various dates).....	1
Every Crew Member of Submarine Has Crucial Role, by M. Zhitnitskiy, Ye. Sheshukov Training Activities Aboard Outstanding, by A. Belousov Maintaining Good Attitude in Short-Time Sailors, by L. Klimchenko	
Flight Training Deficiencies Discussed (L. Faddeyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Dec 76).....	12
Contents of Military Newspapers Critically Reviewed (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Dec 76).....	15
Complaint About Officer Club Construction Delays (I. Moshkovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Dec 76).....	18
Editorial Encourages Commander Innovativeness (Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Dec 76).....	21
Effect of Military Service on Individual Development Discussed (V. Manilov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Dec 76).....	24
Military Commissariat Drafts Active Duty Soldier (A. Drovosekov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Dec 76).....	32
Report and Election Meetings of Komsomol Organizations Reviewed (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Dec 76).....	34
Editorial Stresses Need for Disciplinary Work With Construction Troops (Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Dec 76).....	37

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Disciplinary Practices of Some Commanders Criticized (Yu. Kamalov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 Dec 76).....	40
Vehicle Repair Enterprise Tests New Comprehensive Quality Control System (A. Tertychnyy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Dec 76).....	43
Maintaining High Morale at Central Asian Desert Garrison (A. Taskayev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Dec 76).....	46
Work Meetings Must Be Effective: Purposeful, Short (N. Remizov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Dec 76).....	50
Pilot, Navigator Ratings: Subject for Special Emphasis (Editorial; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Dec 76).....	54
Military Application of Fiber Optics Discussed (A. Markaryan; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Dec 76).....	57
Actions Taken on Readers' Complaints Discussed (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Dec 76).....	60
Private Vehicles of Military Personnel Creating Problems (I. Gordiyenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Dec 76).....	62
Helicopter Gunships Gunnery Training Described (V. Elizbarashvili; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Dec 76).....	64
Irregularities in Military Construction Unit Discussed (V. Arkhipov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Dec 76).....	67
Important Steps to Precise, Uninterrupted Flight Control Discussed (V. Uryuzhnikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Jan 77).....	71
Improved Construction Procedures in Belorussian Military District (V. Charkin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 Jan 77).....	75
Methodological Skill of Officers Key to Training Success (A. Polyakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Jan 77).....	78
Guilty Parties Should Repay State Losses for Property Damage (Just N. Belikeyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Jan 77).....	81
Persistent, Imaginative Physical Training Work in Company Pays Off (G. Bychkovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Jan 77).....	84

NAVAL TRAINING ACTIVITIES: MORALE, MORAL TRAINING, ATTITUDES

Every Crew Member of Submarine Has Crucial Role

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Nov 76 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank-Engr M. Zhitnitskiy, candidate of technical sciences, and Capt 2nd Rank Ye. Sheshukov: "A Link in the Chain"]

[Text] During one of the difficult days of the defense of Sevastopol' a submarine secretly entered the port. In its tanks it carried gasoline, which the combat vehicles needed very much. The city was under steady bombardment and so, after unloading the fuel, the submarine lay on the bottom and waited for night before leaving to get its next load.

Gasoline fumes seeped into the compartments, poisoned the air, and most of the seamen fell unconscious. Only one person remained standing, Chief Petty Officer N. Pustovoytenko. It was unbelievably difficult for him, but at exactly the time ordered by the commander, he put his masterful knowledge of his own and related specializations to work and prepared the ship to surface. All alone! Fresh air rushed into the compartments, bringing the men back to life. At night the submarine set off to sea.

Chief Petty Officer Pustovoytenko's action not only helped save the lives of the crew but also enabled the ship to perform an important mission. And this is striking confirmation of the principle that the success of a military collective, in battle and in training, depends greatly on the skill level of each specialist, his ability to do his work reliably, with initiative. This kind of training is achieved through planned study and purposeful moral guidance; the quality and effectiveness of this process should be measured by the lofty yardstick of battle.

It is not simple to improve quality. One sometimes gets the impression that combat training is as intensive as it can be, that everything possible has been done and further searching for reserves will no longer produce tangible results. Life shows, however, that this is not true. With a creative, thoughtful approach to work any process can and must be made better.

Drills in the specialization were underway on the ship where Capt Lt-Engr A. Rudenko is commander of the electromechanical battle section. They

were practicing the actions of motor mechanics in preparing one of the engines for starting. At first glance everything seemed to be going normally. The officer was strictly observing methodological requirements and the seamen had a pretty good knowledge of the layout of the engine and work instructions. But the final result was poor: the specialists had difficulty finishing in the established time. The next drill was no better.

A detailed analysis of the drill uncovered one unexpected detail. The work instructions, which were exact in themselves, were not "coordinated" with the actual conditions of the engine's placement and did not take account for the design characteristics of the particular ship. If he followed the order contained in the model document, a specialist was forced to perform many superfluous actions, which is what caused the loss of time.

So it turns out that performing the appointed actions exactly and conscientiously is not enough. The drill process must also include searching for ways to improve training, for the optimal, and possibly new, way to solve problems. And the officer who has a good idea of the whole chain of interactions among his subordinates should see the opportunities for raising the effectiveness of combat training.

Capt Lt-Engr A. Rudenko was able to achieve changes in drill results. While adhering strictly to the principles of the instructions he still managed to structure the work of specialists in such a way that the time savings was noticeable.

The main thing a commander does is train his men. To a large extent his success in this duty, how well he trains them, will determine the effectiveness of their labor, their contribution to the common work of the entire crew. But this obvious interrelationship is not completely understood by all.

Every seaman, and even more every commander, knows that the survival capacity of a ship is a key condition of its combat capability. Moreover, the commander knows best of all that success in a struggle for ship survival depends on the teamwork of the entire crew, on the uniform level of training of every seaman. But when the drill in fighting for survival conducted by ship commander Capt Lt V. Imerekov was finished, the review showed that far from all of the participants in the drill were properly prepared for work under the given conditions. This hindered the process of improving the skills of the better-prepared specialists. The drill proved ineffective.

It would not have been hard to identify weaknesses in preparation for the drill ahead of time and eliminate them. All that was required was individual checks, which would include watch officers and watch engineer-mechanics. For only at the drill did it become clear that some officers with good theoretical knowledge had not yet learned to apply it fully in performing a concrete mission.

Of course, everything is not done at once. A new officer does not suddenly become a broadly experienced specialist able to operate successfully with any input. There are various forms of training to give men the skills. But these forms must be used with consideration of the concrete situation in the crew, following the order recommended by pedagogy: from the simple to the complex, from the particular to the general.

In the above case ship commander Capt Lt V. Imerekov violated this order. That is a weakness in command work. The rule here is clear -- the higher an officer's position the more his work will be reflected in the effectiveness of the training and service of the entire collective.

Of course, each commander tries to organize his activity more rationally. But the desire alone is not enough. One must see ways to improve the organization of military labor. It is especially important to think about this now, when accumulated experience is being analyzed before the new training year.

Because we are primarily talking about conducting drills and exercises on board ship, let us see what are the chief things to keep in mind here.

First, the officer should have the clearest possible idea of the final result and primary objective of each training activity. Second, the level of preparation of the men for the particular drill must be analyzed. Third, the officer has to see that the seamen at all battle posts and in every compartment know the main concrete facts about the mission and their role in performing it. At the same time, of course, steps must be taken to create an atmosphere of competition in combat work and to set up socialist competition by missions and standards.

Otherwise, the very first flaw in crew preparation which is "unexpectedly" revealed to the commander may interrupt the entire course of the drill. The commander will have to either stop the drill and eliminate the trouble or let it go and settle for rough, simplified performance of some elements of the training mission.

Although it is rare, the latter way is occasionally taken. In this case there are obviously morale losses in addition to technical drawbacks. We recently watched one of the ship commanders, situated at the main command post, conduct an exercise. His commands were precise and consistent. He understood the mission clearly and correctly saw all stages in fulfilling it... But what was actually happening at the battle posts? There they were only simulating the actions. The entire exercise amounted to a showy exchange of commands and reports. The artificiality and indulgence were perfectly obvious. But this is not the kind of moral atmosphere which promotes improvement in the quality of training.

Yes, the problem of improving the effectiveness and quality of military labor includes a moral aspect in addition to the technical, scientific, and organizational aspects. The ship commander must understand very well that military and moral training are inseparable. The outstanding specialist,

the real fighting man, begins with a profound understanding of the importance of his work and a conviction that it is essential for the entire collective. This is a broad field for work by the commander, all officers, and the party and Komsomol organizations.

The training of a ship's crew, the formation of a military collective, is a complex process. It cannot be viewed as a simple series of independent tasks and stages. Everything in it is interrelated and everything must be resolved together. Each component of this process, whether we are talking of one individual's training or the quality of one drill, is a distinct link in the chain. But it is a link which determines the strength of the whole chain. To understand this and take care of the strength of the chain is our most important duty.

Training Activities Aboard Outstanding

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Nov 76 p 2

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank A. Belousov: "Miles for Growing Up"]

[Text] For three years in a row the crew of the submarine commanded by Capt 2nd Rank A. Belousov, holder of the Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces 3rd Degree, has kept the title of outstanding ship. In the last training year the seamen performed combat training missions during ocean cruises and recieved outstanding marks. The crew has become 100 percent rated and one submariner of three on the ship is a specialist 1st class or master.

The hatch was shut tightly, the submarine took on ballast, and we headed for the assigned depth. From this moment the only connection between us and our home base for many, many days would be the invisible lines of radio communication. And the life of the crew would be defined not by the alternation of day and night, but rather by the precise changing of watches, "four on, eight off," as the seamen say. But the ship was not going to sea simply to travel hundreds and thousands of miles, although of course this requires great skill and steadfastness. Submariners leave base to train hard on the cruise, to master the equipment and weapons in tough weather conditions. And the process of molding the combat crew as a whole depends above all on the rhythm of training and competition set from the very beginning and the standards used to evaluate the results of the actions of each submariner, especially the officers.

The past training year got off to a rough start for us. It happened that we had several subunits headed by new officers without adequate experience working with men and organizing training and competition. But the ocean does not recognize the excuse of youth, just as it does not forgive the slightest carelessness. The development of the new officers had to be stepped up.

Some may perhaps see this as a paradox (it is usually said that one must teach before one can demand results) but we began by making higher demands of all new officers without exception. Checks and more checks -- that was the pivot around which ideological educational, training methods, and cultural domestic activities were grouped. And the ship party bureau took a most active part in all of this work.

In taking such a position we based ourselves primary on the fairly high level of general training of the officers (every one is a graduate military engineer) and on a practically tested principle: if an officer is helped to organize his labor precisely and rationally he will be able to do 1.5-2 times as much as usual.

But strict checks and constant high standards, like any other educational factor, are effective only when they are applied with due regard for the traits of the individual, when thoughtful analysis of a person's behavior, his strong and weak points, precedes the action to influence that person.

For example, Lt V. Peredero, commander of mine-torpedo battle section BCh-3, had serious difficulties during the first weeks of the cruise. He had received a subunit which already carried the title of outstanding. Most of the seamen had high qualifications and had taken part in many complex fire situations. It is no secret that the men compared the lieutenant unfavorably with the officer under whom the battle section had become one of the best on the ship. The new commander made mistakes. This grieved him but, unfortunately, did not cause him to ask experienced officers for help. He also shied away from practical dealings with the best specialists in the section; he probably considered it beneath his dignity to go to a battle post and figure out some question together with a warrant officer (and master of military affairs).

In short, things were shaping up against the lieutenant, and this was reflected in the state of affairs in the section. The next time results from competition were totaled it was no longer a winner. Soon after, in a seminar on tactics, I was myself forced to give the officer a poor mark.

I had a thorough talk with Lieutenant Peredero. It was really only then that the mistakes in the working style and self-training methodology of the young officer became clear. I will not hide the fact that I had to talk with the lieutenant many times and he attended a session of the party bureau. But the main thing was accomplished. Peredero got rid of his negative self-image and began studying the work more thoroughly and mastering the practical side of his specialization. The young officer's prestige rose both in the battle section and in the ward-room. By the end of the cruise the section was again one of the leaders. Our ship performed all torpedo firings with outstanding marks and the commander of BCh-3 deserves much credit for this.

The development of Lieutenant Peredero took place in view of all the new officers and became a singular kind of milestone in their service. At the very least it convinced them that the help and assistance of senior officers would invariably be combined with high demands and constant checks.

However, this analytic and demanding approach to work is the rule among us in other areas as well as in individual moral training. It proved equally effective in the struggles for effective competition and for the quality of combat and technical training. After all, in the last analysis all problems of the development of a military collective and raising ship combat readiness can be considered in isolation only for purposes of analysis; in life they are interrelated and must be resolved together.

At the start of the training year we checked the organization of special training. The analysis showed that it could be more effective. Certain officers, for example Sr Lt A. Kulakov and Lt V. Peredero, still had not learned to use the competitive factor purposefully to deepen specialist training. Seamen with different lengths of service were performing the same standard in conditions which did not change from one day to the next. Training periods and drills were reviewed without relating them to the seamen's socialist obligations. The dullest kind of leveling occurred. The men did not know what exact goals they were supposed to work toward, and naturally they did not have a strong desire to fight for first place in combat work and defeat their rival in competition. The battle posts have good graphic aids and the group leaders sometimes explained the material in detail. But they did this without a system, unrelated to the concrete missions facing the subunit. It is obvious that such mistakes in the organization and methodology of special training gave rise to the men's indifference to training and could have caused already acquired knowledge and skills to be lost.

We organized a series of demonstration training periods and drills on the ship. The most qualified officers and warrant officers, masters of military affairs, shared their methodological know-how and offered suggestions to increase the enthusiasm of competitors and make more effective use of trainers and training aids. Staff officers were very helpful to us during this period. Their recommendations provided the foundation for organizing competition based on missions and standards during the cruise.

Contests began to be held on board ship during all stages of the cruise for such titles as best specialist or for best knowledge of operations instructions. Seamen and petty officers began taking tests. An effective form of competition among officers was the campaign for the right to receive authorization to perform duties at the next level higher than the one occupied. Capt Lt-Engrs I. Rud'ko and V. Prokhorov were the first to get this authorization.

The combat shift is becoming the center of competition on cruising submarines. It is within the combat shift that all crew members regardless of affiliation with a particular subunit stand bridge watch and service the ship's engines and systems. Command competition among combat shifts during the cruise was begun at the initiative of Capt Lt-Engr V. Molochnyy, a member of the party bureau.

Incidentally, there is nowhere else like the ocean for testing the ability of a submariner to react instantly to a change in the situation and analyze

it precisely and his readiness to act boldly, skillfully, and confidently. Of course, cruising the ocean depths and standing cruise watch are very educational by themselves. But a much greater effect is achieved when training at sea is regularly filled with various surprise inputs (which have been carefully planned) and is conducted against a complex tactical background.

On our ship it has become the rule for each combat shift, in addition to its main duties of servicing operating systems and installations, to take and react to several purely tactical inputs, practice methods of fighting for survival in various compartments, and make astronomical calculations. The quality of actions in solving these inputs is one of the chief criteria in determining places among competing combat shifts. Even the smallest errors are considered here and the officers who head the combat shifts know that every mistake will be observed and subjected to strict analysis.

In the year of the 25th CPSU Congress the crew of the ship became 100 percent rated and one out of three of our submariners received a higher qualification. Nonetheless we must recognize that we still have not made full use of the capabilities of the military collective, in which all officers have higher education. To be frank, the errors and omissions that we have been talking about could have been prevented by more thoughtful work with the men.

In support of the initiative of the crew of the nuclear missile submarine which called on all Navy personnel to begin competition to greet the 60th anniversary of Great October well, the seamen of our submarine adopted lofty socialist obligations. The main ones are: strive to raise the combat readiness of the ship even higher; keep the title of outstanding crew; keep the ocean watch vigilantly. A thorough discussion of our reserves and wise use of the know-how accumulated during cruises was held at a meeting of personnel and in the party organization. The crew is ready to do everything necessary to see that during the new training year the ocean miles are the forward edge of the struggle for effective, high-quality combat and political training, miles in which each submariner will grow as a fighting man.

Maintaining Good Attitude in Short-Time Sailors

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Nov 76 p 2

[Article by Capt 2nd Rank-Engr L. Klimchenko: "Until the Last Day of Service -- Life and Problems of the Military Collective"]

[Text] They stood in formation while the north wind, streaming down from the low Asian hills, tore at the bands of their sailor caps. This was the last time they would come for the raising of the Navy flag. The last time they would see the cloth of the ship's flag raised on its standard above the superstructure of the submarine and fluttering like an uncertain flame.

They stood on the right flank, in the place of honor within the formation, on this day, and deservedly so. They had labored honorably until their last day of service. And it could be said, without exaggeration, that at this solemn and sad moment of parting the mechanisms and instruments of the submarine were still warm from their working hands.

Walking through the compartment the day before I had found Petty Officer 1st Class Z. Mirzaliyev in one of the holds, the one under his control. It was always in exemplary condition. And even now, although the petty officer could see as well as I could that everything was in good shape,-- the valves were shut off and lubricated, the deck was dry, and the paint was clean -- still he was energetically polishing things up. In the next compartment Mirzaliyev's comrade and peer Petty Officer 2nd Class V. Moroshkov was working on the fine tuning of a complex mechanism. And it was that way at many of the battle posts; all the men who were to leave the crew the next day were on this day working as hard as ever.

I looked into their faces. Did we, the officers who trained them, do all that we could to see that their years of naval service were a stage in their ethical maturation and development as fighting men and citizens? Was everything possible done so that the words which rang out at the 25th CPSU Congress could truthfully be applied to the sailors being discharged into the reserve: these are men who have been through the school of endurance and discipline and have received technical, vocational, and political training?

It seems to me that to answer these questions with strict criteria of truth one should take a good look at the behavior of each seaman in his last year of service.

As experience shows, all shortcomings in troop moral training made for whatever reasons in earlier years show themselves most fully in the last year of service. And it may happen that a seaman who has not given the commander any particular problems before will suddenly change his behavior, and not at all for the better.

What is the reason for this? One cannot fail to see the differences that objectively exist between the new seaman and his senior comrade who is finishing his service. These differences show themselves in military and life experience and in maturity of viewpoints concerning events in the collective. And of course, the greatest difference is in level of special training.

But while we recognize these differences as natural, we should very definitely stress that it is neither natural nor acceptable for certain seamen in their last year of service to try to carry over their superiority in knowledge and experience into the spheres of regulations and moral relations. Others form the impression that they can be somewhat indulgent with themselves in work and with respect to military discipline. This first shows itself in such deviations from order as being late to formation and being out of uniform, but it may grow into more serious things. If timely preventive steps are not taken, of course.

Some commanders and political workers think that the less talk there is on the sometimes touchy matter of relations within the collective the better it will be. When I chanced to ask one of the officers how he structures moral training for fighting men whose term of service is running out he answered straight out, "We don't single them out. You might think of them as the old guard. We work the same with everyone." After this it is no surprise to see how the seamen of this crew look, even in an everyday situation such as crossing from the barracks to the messhall. Marching smartly in front are the new men; the last ranks are in disorder. It is not hard to guess that it is the "old guard" bringing up the rear.

In leading crews the contingent of seamen in their last year of service is a special concern to officers and the party and Komsomol organizations. The goal which they pursue might be formulated this way: bolster the reputation of this group of seamen (there are, incidentally, quite a few petty officers among them too). But it must be a genuine, positive reputation. This is not at all the same as creating transitory, false, or misunderstood prestige.

How does this work in practice? As an example, on our ship we developed a standard procedure of holding regular talks concerning the responsibility of experienced seamen for the state of affairs in the crew, setting an example of military discipline, and training a worthy replacement for the men going into the reserve. Officers and warrant officers sometimes consult with these seamen on questions of improving the quality of training periods and drills in specializations and increasing vigilance during bridge watch. The tone of such meetings is respectful and business-like, but the main thing is that we try to see that decisions made are put into effect, that demandingness in large things and small is the norm. Monitoring and checking performance are mandatory elements of educational work.

I will take the example of Petty Officer 1st Class A. Kharnayev. At one of the petty officer meetings the question of compliance with the daily schedule was being discussed. Some violations occurred right in front of squad leaders, and in a few cases they themselves had been disorganized. Specifically, such a charge was made against Kharnayev. But at first he did not draw the necessary conclusions. The commander of the battle section had to begin watching his every step at work. It was also helpful that Kharnayev's "liberty" was not understood by most of the seamen who had served time equal to his. Kharnayev soon overcame his weakness and began to be more active in relation to other seamen who permitted violations of the schedule of the day.

This example is perhaps not striking enough, so that it suffers in the eyes of the reader. In real life, however, when educational work is begun after some "striking" misdeed this is usually evidence of the commanders' dulled pedagogical sensitivity, their failure to give attention to "first symptoms" of the problem which occurred but were not handled in a principled way.

While devoting constant attention to unifying the military collective and maintaining a healthy moral atmosphere in it, the ship commander and party

organization attach special significance to what is customarily called public opinion. Molding it is by no means a spontaneous process. In our view the chief task here is to avoid, using psychological terminology, a divergence between the evaluation of certain phenomena on the official and unofficial levels.

For example, if the behavior of a seaman is criticized by commanders but he hears words of sympathy from just two or three fellow servicemen it is a flaw in our educational work. Well-planned party and Komsomol meetings help us set the mood of the collective. Capt 3rd Rank V. Yemtsov, secretary of the party organization, attaches special importance to working with young communists who are regular-term seamen. The most active submariners, those who have done well in their first years of service and proved themselves in Komsomol work, are admitted to the party ranks. Because they are constantly with the seamen they know the life of the collective, the strong and weak points of their comrades, in detail. These men do a great deal to put relations among the men on a principled basis and to influence their behavior and attitudes.

The following example is characteristic. Seamen I. Ryazanov was transferred to us from another crew. He arrived with a service record full of reprimands. From the first days he tried to set himself up in the status of "veteran having a well-deserved rest." It was apparent that he was intending to serve out his time until discharge into the reserve in the easiest way possible.

But this is where the opinion of the collective made itself known. The new seaman met unanimous condemnation, which had never happened to him before, and he began thinking seriously about his behavior. It is too soon to say that Ryazanov has become a model seaman, but he has made noticeable changes for the better and there is reason to hope that, with the beneficial influence of the collective, they will increase. At least he has realized that he will not get any special privileges until the last day of service.

While all of the prerequisites to successful work with seamen in the last year of service we have noted above are important, the factor which finally determines its effectiveness is the posture of the officer who commands the subunit. The achievements of the subunit are based on his unwavering high standards, concern for regulation order, and ability to guide the energy of the experienced seamen into necessary channels, rely on petty officers in work with the new men, and prevent undesirable deviations from regulation precepts.

In this sense, we on the ship often compare the work styles of officers V. Yemtsov and A. Nikhayenko, two subunit commanders. The former makes active use of the requirements of pedagogy and psychology in work with the men and approaches each one individually. The results can be seen -- the fighting men of this battle section are bound by strong friendship and mutual assistance. All the seamen there become specialists 1st class, usually in the second year of service. Sr Lt A. Nikhayenko, by contrast,

shies away from analyzing relations within the collective and to a large extent lets things go their own way. Is it any surprise that his sincere desire to join the ranks of the winners in competition is still far from realization?

The measures of "Departure of the Slav," the march played while our seamen leave the ship and the navy, rang out and floated upward into the clear sky. Many of them had firmly set their courses in life. Petty Officer 1st Class Yu. Gubushkin, after a strict selection process, had been accepted on one of the Arctic icebreakers. Several of his comrades also wanted to work in the Far North. Yes, we will miss them. But those who remain with us have picked up their knowledge and responsible attitude toward the work. The day of departure will come for them too. So let us hope that they too, on the last day of service, will take their place on the right flank of the crew. And not just by tradition, but also by right.

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FLIGHT TRAINING DEFICIENCIES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by Col L. Faddeyev: "Right to Fly"]

[Text] I remember the tough war years. Fighters, bombers, and ground-attack aircraft were being produced in increasing quantities, and with improving performance characteristics. No matter how difficult the situation was, our pilots, engineers and technicians made an effort totally to master the new equipment, because they knew that this was necessary for combat, for victory over the enemy.

I remember the particular enthusiasm which which the aviators in our squadron worked to master a new bomber. The men worked hard, endeavoring to gain a thorough understanding of the design and operational features of this aircraft, piloting techniques and combat employment. Soon the top aircrews began "squeezing" out of the airplane even more performance than was designed into it, particularly in the area of increasing bomb load and short-field takeoff.

What attended this combat success? First and foremost thorough preparation for each and every mission and thorough study of the capabilities of the equipment and weapons, as well as the adversary's strong and weak points. No, my fighting fellow regiment personnel, the top pilots and aircrews, did not count on luck. Their unbending faith in victory was backed up by persistent military labor. And this ensured success in combat.

But sometimes the following situations occurred. On one occasion Senior Lieutenant Belous made a bad mistake in performing a mission. This officer was no air novice, having logged considerable time. Sometimes one would be simple amazed and delighted at his skill, such as his ability to spot an enemy fighter immediately in the night sky, or his ability to maneuver vigorously when under hostile antiaircraft fire.

In analyzing the mistake, however, it was determined that the crew captain had not been conscientious in studying the equipment. For a certain time gaps in the pilot's knowledge did not result in gross errors. But on a mission which was running longer than usual it was necessary to pump fuel out of an auxiliary fuselage tank. What happened? The copilot fouled up the sequence of procedures, while the pilot was unable to correct his subordinate, because he himself was unfamiliar with the finer points of the fuel transfer operation.

A critical air situation developed. They were almost out of fuel, there were no alternate airfields in the vicinity, and they could not make it back to their own field. Should they make a forced landing? That would be a risky operation; they might not only smash the aircraft but kill themselves as well. It was only by pure chance that the crew was able to extricate itself from this predicament.

The pilot was let down by the fact that he was not properly prepared for the mission and that he possessed weak, superficial knowledge of operating procedures. At a difficult moment his past experience was unable to bail him out.

Without question, today's equipment is far from that flown in the past, even 15 years ago. Today's supersonic missile-armed aircraft is a real combat complex, containing various automatic and radio electronic devices and systems and carrying potent armament. Aircraft aerodynamics have also changed substantially, and this requires an intelligent approach to every element of flight, to every aircraft handling operation and combat maneuver. In order to utilize in full measure the combat capabilities of a missile-armed aircraft for victory in combat, the pilot should possess flawless professional competence and excellent moral-combat qualities.

Top-proficiency pilots, expert missile, cannon and bombing marksmen, are distinguished by outstanding combat skills. Our flying fraternity is famous for its great air warriors, strong spirit, totally dedicated to the homeland, capable of performing the most complex mission with maximum effectiveness. On what is their success in combat improvement based? A high degree of awareness of their military duty. A sense of personal responsibility for the success of every task and mission, be it complex or simple. And, of course, top-grade air warriors are distinguished by daily, persistent military labor.

But sometimes it happens that a pilot, who has not particularly demonstrated flying proficiency, starts talking as follows: "I need a new airplane, then things will go better." In short, he would then show how good he is. And yet one senses in his words a disrespectful attitude toward the aircraft which has been entrusted to his care.

Lt Yu. Nechayev said something along these lines. A young pilot, he could not wait to get behind the controls of a supersonic fighter. His commanding officer, seeing the pilot's strong desire, tried to accommodate him. But then Nechayev began flying an aircraft which was new to him. He started having problems. On one training flight he flipped the wrong switch by mistake -- instead of reloading his weapon he dumped his auxiliary tanks. On another occasion he mixed up the targets while firing at the gunnery range. He then started making mistakes on his landing approach. What was the reason for this?

They began looking into the matter, and it turned out that the young pilot lacked that flying sharpness which ensures free, easy handling of the aircraft without stress, giving the pilot time for well-conceived, precise and flawless actions in his cockpit procedures. But why had his commanding officer and flight instructor failed to see this? As it turns out, they had overestimated the ability of the young pilot. But the lieutenant's problems were due not only to miscalculations in training method. He himself was primarily to blame for what had happened. His desire, which is most praiseworthy, to fly a new aircraft had not been backed up by the officer with persistent training; he had a cool, indifferent attitude toward training classes and drills.

Combat skills and thorough knowledge of equipment do not come without work. Chkalov was right when he said: "You have to treat an airplane with respect." Today, in the age of the supersonic missile-armed aircraft, these words are particularly meaningful. The right to fly is a great trust. And one should not forget this fact.

3024

CSO: 1801

CONTENTS OF MILITARY NEWSPAPERS CRITICALLY REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Dec 76 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Elaborate an Important Topic More Deeply: A Review of the Press"]

[Text] The political and military indoctrination of personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces has always been the object of special concern on the part of commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations. Today much is being done to adopt a comprehensive approach to ideological indoctrination work. This is demanded by the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and by the responsible tasks facing the Armed Forces.

Experience in combining political, military and moral indoctrination of all categories of military personnel is reflected on the pages of district, group and fleet newspapers. And we should note that the materials being published offer a graphic picture of how since the 25th CPSU Congress ideological-indoctrinational work in the subunits, units and on naval ships has become richer in content, more diversified and effective in forms. Utilizing various genres, the newspapers analyze and synthesize the experience of this work and reveal the most effective methods of forming excellent moral-fighting qualities in people and achieving further consolidation of military collectives.

BOYEVOYE ZNAMYA, newspaper of the Red-Banner Central Asian Military District, discusses problems of personnel indoctrination in a planned, scheduled manner. It discusses in detail the experience of military personnel study of Marxist-Leninist theory, the historic resolutions and documents of the 25th CPSU Congress, the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and the address by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev at the Plenum. In its articles the newspaper is campaigning for a high ideological level of lectures and seminar classes. Discussing the participation in propaganda work by delegates to the 25th CPSU Congress, commanders and political workers, BOYEVOYE ZNAMYA focuses

particular attention on the ideological-theoretical training of propagandist cadres and urges them to rely constantly on the recommendations of science in their work. Many articles are distinguished by a critical, constructive attitude. As an example we might cite the articles entitled "Active and Passive," "Prisoner of Formalism," and others.

The newspaper raises problems of indoctrination of military personnel in the course of combat training. Emphasizing the unswerving incorporation of the demands of military regulations in military life and service, it demonstrates how in training drills and at exercises conducted under conditions maximally approaching actual combat, enlisted men, noncommissioned officers and officers receive schooling in staunchness and courage, endurance and skill. For example, in the articles entitled "Firestorms Over the Gunnery Range," "Under Conditions of Reduced Visibility" and others, persuasive examples are used to reveal the work experience and know-how of leading commanders and political workers, who skillfully utilize a complex tactical situation in order to raise even higher the men's fighting spirit and to consolidate excellent moral-combat qualities in personnel.

We could also mention a number of other newspapers which discuss in a highly-qualified manner the activities of commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations, their ability to combine political indoctrination of personnel with military indoctrination. However, the newspapers frequently do a poor job of reflecting practical experience in forming in enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and warrant officers those moral qualities which are essential to each and every fighting man. In some newspapers articles are rarely published on this topic and in an erratic manner.

Some editorial staffs reduce the essence of the comprehensive approach to ideological-indoctrination work in the army and navy, extending the principles of comprehensiveness and combination only to political agitation and propaganda. Precisely this narrowing can be seen, for example, in the newspaper of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, FLAG RODINY. It is true that this newspaper has made attempts to analyze in a unified manner the political, military and moral indoctrination of personnel on board some ships. For example, in a series of articles under the general heading "Under Conditions of a Long Cruise," Capt 3d Rank I. Boyko, deputy commander for political affairs on the cruiser "Dzerzhinskiy," shared his experience in indoctrinational work on a long cruise. The author succeeded in showing its intensive nature and the endeavor on the part of commanders, political workers and party activists to encompass with their influence all areas of crew activities: combat and political training, the standing of watches, daily living routine and leisure time. But even in these articles it is difficult to see a comprehensive approach to the performance of indoctrinational tasks, the forms and methods of its implementation.

Speaking of deficiencies in discussion of comprehensive ideological indoctrinational work, we should note that not everywhere is there proper reflection of matters connected with the specific features of indoctrination of different categories of military personnel. Topics revealing the various aspects of individual work and the forming of military collectives await deeper elaboration.

It is important that matters pertaining to a comprehensive approach to indoctrination of military personnel be discussed in the press in a planned and purposeful manner. We are speaking not so much of regularity of appearance of articles, although this is of considerable importance, as of discussion of the main trends in this area. One cannot be satisfied with random materials in which the topic is only mentioned but not elaborated with sufficient completeness. District, group and fleet newspapers should be tireless collectors of valuable know-how and experience in indoctrination of personnel, and active disseminators and organizers of adoption of all new and advanced elements into daily practice. It is necessary to demonstrate in a more businesslike manner the organizational and methods aspects of the indoctrinational activities of commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations.

Carrying out the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and the instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense and Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy for the new training year, district, group and fleet newspapers should comprehensively and thoroughly demonstrate the diversified activities of commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations aimed at securing a unity of organization and ideological-indoctrination work at all echelons and at all levels. Higher-quality accomplishment of this task will be a worthy contribution by army and navy newspaper staffs toward further increasing the combat readiness of subunits, units, and naval ships.

3024

CSO: 1801

COMPLAINT ABOUT OFFICER CLUB CONSTRUCTION DELAYS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Dec 76 p 4

[Article by Lt Col (Res) I. Moshkovskiy: "Red Tape"]

[Text] A note of alarm sounded in a letter written by officers A. Grigor'yev, I. Naumenko and others. "Send a representative," they requested of the editors. "Let him see with his own eyes how repairs on our cultural center have dragged on intolerably...."

So I went to Yaroslavl'. I studied, and I believe I can phrase it this way, the history of the repairs, or more correctly, the restoration of the building housing the garrison's officers' club. It is located downtown, easy to find. Any local resident can tell you how to get there, but he will also comment: "But it is closed for repairs."

Closed for repairs. That is what they say today, that is what they said last year, and the year before last. Let us go back to the beginning.

In the spring of 1973 the ceiling in the auditorium started sagging. Specialists from the garrison housing operations unit, who had been hastily summoned to the site, first tried to reinforce it. But they soon saw that minor repairs would not do the job. A report was dispatched to the KEU [Housing Operations Directorate] of the Moscow Air Defense District. An inspection commission came out, not soon, but eventually, and reached the following conclusion: the building could no longer be used; it had to receive major repairs and renovation.

This of course did not please the staff at the Officers' Club and its many users, this order to close down the cultural center. But if it must be done, there is no use arguing about it. They only requested that repairs be performed speedily, since signs of delay had already appeared: the ceiling sagged in April, but the inspectors did not arrive until the end of the year. It is hard to say whether this request ever reached the appropriate officials at the KEU, and in particular the officer in charge, Col N. Alekseyev. One thing is obvious, however; nobody was planning to

expedite the repairs. Another six months went by, and finally a contract was signed with an architect organization to draw up plans for the Officers' Club renovation and restoration.

Now the red tape began within the KEU. From there, as if running a relay race, it shifted to the city planning organization. The first version of the plans was in progress there for about nine months. Finally it was completed. But it contained so many defects that the plans had to be put into the dead file and work begun on a new, second version. The second version was not ready until November 1975. Thus the architects, headed by chief engineer A. Pestov, dragged things on even longer than their client. But not without his "assistance." Having signed a contract with the design organization, the KEU officials decided they had done their part. Although they of course were aware that their duties included many other items: it was their job to obtain from municipal organizations the requisite documents, certificates, and agreements. They realized that they had dumped all this work onto the shoulders of the director and manager of the Officers' Club.

This is an unusual building. The headquarters of the "Yaroslavl' Military Force" was located here during the Patriotic War of 1812. As a historical monument (and this year it was designated by the state as an architectural monument) it has a special status in Yaroslavl'. In order to coordinate everything and to receive permission for its renovation and restoration, persons who were not supposed to be charged with this task were forced to spend a good deal of time and effort. Even now the matter is not completely settled.

In the assumption that everything was already in order, the people at the KEU of the Moscow Air Defense District did not wait for the plans to be completed. They included the project in their 1975 work schedule. The construction people were given a target -- to spend 130,000 rubles. Actually they spent only 1,500. And how can they work blind, without plans? Eventually, to be true, they did receive the plans. But this was... that first version, which was rejected. In addition, they had not yet received permission from the city authorities to go ahead with the job.

Finally 1975 came to an end. Everybody who had been waiting so long and patiently for the Officers' Club to open assumed that the ice would finally break up in 1976, and that all the problems slowing down the project would be corrected. But these were empty hopes.

The fact is that the project was once again placed on the construction schedule, but its completion was not scheduled for this year. For some reason the client even reduced the amount allocated below the previous year's amount. The plan called for spending only 100,000 rubles, that is, approximately half the total cost of renovation. Why? The people at the

KEU evidently decided to be more cautious, in view of the bitter experience of the previous year.

We do not intend to debate the correctness of this decision. Let us see how the scheduled money is being spent. I visited the site in the middle of November. There were only a few construction workers there, but some work was being done. Looking into the past, the picture at the site has changed frequently. Sometimes work would be in full swing, and sometimes nothing would be happening. And not because there was a shortage of construction workers, but for other reasons. The main obstacle was a lack of building materials, particularly metal and lumber. As a result this year's target is also being threatened. Only 45,000 rubles have been spent.

The winter has been with us for some time, and yet the building is without a roof. They demolished the old one but have not replaced it. The walls are pelted by snow and rain, and the costly stucco moulding is being ruined. It is quite obvious that the construction people are very cool about this project. Feeling guilty, Lt Col Tech Serv G. Nevskiy, chief of the Office of the Work Supervisor, assured me: "We shall try to meet the target by 80 percent anyway." But the end of the year is very close. When are they going to do this?

While looking into the delay on restoring the building housing the Yaroslavl' Garrison Officers' Club, I suddenly recalled an article entitled "Dragged-On Intermission" which appeared in last year's 4 November issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Its description of an irresponsible attitude toward repair of an officers' club is very similar to the case I was investigating, and this was not mere happenstance. The principal culprits in both cases were the same -- officials of the KEU of the Moscow Air Defense District.

Of course such an attitude toward renovation and repair of officers' clubs and recreation facilities is intolerable. One would hope that those officials who can influence those responsible for this red tape will look into this matter and will properly deal with the "dragged-on intermission" in the activities of the Yaroslavl' Garrison Officers' Club.

3024

CSO: 1801

EDITORIAL ENCOURAGES COMMANDER INNOVATIVENESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Dec 76 p 1

[Editorial: "The Commander and a Sense of the New"]

[Text] The 25th CPSU Congress and the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum focus our cadres on an all-out improvement in the effectiveness and quality of work at all echelons, an organic combination of discipline with initiative and an innovative approach to the task, plus extensive utilization of existing reserve potential and capabilities as well as advanced know-how. These demands also apply in full measure to military cadres, particularly commanders -- organizers of the training and indoctrination of their subordinates. Supported by party and Komsomol organizations, the commanders of subunits, units and naval ships are mobilizing personnel for total and high-quality completion of training schedules and programs, and meeting of pledges in socialist competition to honor the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

A well-balanced, precise, fully-substantiated system of training and indoctrination has been established in the army and navy. Life moves forward, however; under the influence of the scientific and technological revolution, radical changes are taking place in all areas of military affairs, particularly in armament, equipping of army and navy, and in the methods and forms of waging armed combat. Year by year there is an increase in the demands placed on moral-fighting qualities and proficiency of personnel and the combat readiness of units and naval ships. This is why military regulations require command personnel continuously to improve methods of control and management of the subunit, unit, and naval ship, that they study and adopt in a practical manner all new and advanced innovations which promote increase in the effectiveness of training and indoctrination of subordinates.

In order to march in step with the times, commanders should possess a deeper mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory, should comprehend new phenomena in the development of military affairs, in training of army and navy personnel, and should continuously improve the methods and techniques of

training and indoctrination, moral-political and psychological training of military personnel. The commander's innovative search is grounded on a solid philosophical, methodological foundation and firm knowledge of field manuals and regulations, orders and directives, as well as other guideline documents. This enables him to organize training and indoctrination on a rigorously scientific basis, to eliminate the obsolete from practical activities, and actively to adopt all new, advanced, efficient innovations into the training and indoctrination process and into organization of socialist competition.

Army and navy practical activities are rich in examples of the innovative, creative approach by our military cadres to performance of the tasks facing them. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Altashin, commanding officer of a certain unit (he was recently promoted to this position), supported by his deputies, the party and Komsomol organizations, adopted many new things into the methodology of combat training of missile crews. This made it possible to shorten the time required to train skilled specialists and to ensure total mutual interchangeability in the crews. Capt 2d Rank A. Belousov, commander of a submarine, introduced many new things in improving the technical training of his men while on an ocean cruise. Thanks to this, all the men in the crew became proficiency-rated specialists, and one out of three earned a top proficiency rating.

A creative alliance between commanders, political workers, staff officers on the one hand and military scientists on the other produces great benefit in improving the forms and methods of training and indoctrination. The commanding officers of a number of radar units in the National Air Defense Forces, for example, successfully tested in a practical manner, together with military psychologists, a new method of step-by-step forming of knowledge and skills in specialists. Excellent results were obtained. Presently this method is being extensively employed in radar units.

Unfortunately some commanding officers keep their distance from innovative search, shun the new, teach their subordinates in the old way, without taking into account changes in military hardware and methods of combat operations. New, more effective methods of servicing and operating equipment and weapons are utilized successfully in one unit, while in the neighboring unit they are either totally ignorant of this valuable know-how or do little to adopt it. Of course such situations are intolerable.

In the new training year there is much for commanders, political officers, staffs, party and Komsomol organizations to do in order further to improve the quality and effectiveness of each training activity, be it a training drill, an exercise, missile firing, flight training, or ocean cruise. This obliges them to rely more vigorously on the achievements of Soviet military science and practical activities, continuously to renew and broaden the arsenal of forms and methods of training and indoctrination.

Adoption of scientific organization of military labor is the object of continuous concern on the part of a commander. It is necessary more resolutely to combat all manifestations of disorganization and inefficient utilization of training time. Each and every class instructor, each commander in organizing training should proceed from the position of offering his men a maximum amount of knowledge and skills per unit of time expended. One should constantly improve training facilities and more fully utilize their potential.

To teach personnel what they must know in war has been and remains the main requirement. Commander thinking should be focused on creation of a dynamic, high-intensity situation in the course of practice drills and training sessions, requiring of the men bold actions of initiative, and innovative approach to solving the problems which arise. Only in this manner is it possible to ensure a high level of performance in the field, in the air, and at sea.

It is important that there be created in every military collective an atmosphere of high demandingness, dissatisfaction with what has been achieved, and a continuous, innovative search. The flame of competition burns strongly and the bonds of soldier comradeship become strong in joint labor, in the search for the new in forms and methods of training and indoctrination of personnel, in the area of maintenance and combat utilization of equipment and weapons. Commanders and political workers should focus the innovative thinking of their men toward resolving first and foremost those problems the solution of which determines success in completing training schedules and programs and meeting socialist pledges.

To open wide the door for the new and progressive means to utilize even better the great force of example. Unabating attention should be devoted to the study and adoption of the experience and know-how of experts in the combat occupational specialties and the leading military collectives -- the right-flankers in socialist competition.

Our Armed Forces contain well-trained military cadres who are dedicated to the cause of communism. Further increase in their ideological-theoretical conditioning and professional skills as well as improvement in their work style will make it possible to raise even higher the level of military discipline and organization, the combat readiness of subunits, units, and naval ships.

3024
CSO: 1801

EFFECT OF MILITARY SERVICE ON INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Dec 76 pp 2-3

[Article by Lt Col V. Manilov: "Military Service and Development of the Individual"]

[Text] Comprehensive development of all members of society is the highest goal and at the same time a mandatory condition for success in building communism. This development is secured by the entire socialist way of life, but first and foremost by means of persistent and purposeful ideological-indoctrinational work by the Communist Party. Military service plays an important role in the indoctrination of Soviet citizens. "Young men enter the military family without having been schooled in life," noted the Central Committee Report to the 25th CPSU Congress. "But they return from the army as adults, who have gone through the school of self-mastery and discipline, who have acquired technical, professional knowledge and political training."

I.

The role of Soviet military service in forming the new man and in comprehensive development of his personality is logically dictated by the class nature, by the political function, by the social structure and all vital activities of the Armed Forces, built upon the unshakable foundation of a scientific materialistic philosophical outlook, Marxist-Leninist ideology.

By its class nature our armed forces are genuinely popular. To use Lenin's definition, they were created in a new way, by the workers and peasants themselves, on a foundation of their solid alliance and with the leadership role of the worker class. Lenin demanded that a "new discipline, a new military organization" be elaborated precisely on this foundation, that socialism be consolidated in our army, and emphasized that then it will be invincible ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], vol 37, pp 200, 295).

In the process of building socialism and communism, as a result of radical changes in the social structure of the Soviet society, our armed forces were transformed from an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat into an agency of our popular, national state. The internal function of the armed forces has become totally exhausted, while the existence of its external functions is dictated exclusively by the necessity of ensuring external political conditions for the peaceful building of a new society.

The content of the external function of our armed forces also determines their political function as an instrument of defense of the cause of the worker class and all the toilers, the cause of building communism, freedom, independence and security of peoples against the encroachments of imperialism. The might of the USSR Armed Forces objectively serves the root interests of the Soviet people, the peoples of the brother socialist countries, and the interests of world peace. "Our armed forces," stated L. I. Brezhnev, "are indoctrinated in a spirit of deep dedication to the socialist homeland, to the ideals of peace and internationalism, to the ideals of friendship among peoples. It is precisely here that the Soviet Armed Forces differ from bourgeois armies. It is precisely for this that Soviet citizens love and are proud of their Armed Forces."

The fundamentally new class nature and political function of the armed forces have evoked a radical change in the character of military service and in the attitude of the broad masses toward it. For the first time in history it has been transformed from a difficult obligation, alien to toiling people, into the vital business of the toilers themselves, becoming a sacred obligation, execution of which elevates man and spiritually enriches him. Perception of military labor is a component part of the national business of building a new society, and deep comprehension of their personal responsibility for defense of the socialist homeland constitutes the lofty ideological motive of the entire life and activities of Soviet military personnel.

The beneficent influence of military service on the individual is also objectively dictated by the social structure of the Armed Forces of the USSR. From the very moment of the birth of our Armed Forces, revolutionary workers have comprised its nucleus. Their discipline, organization and collectivism became an effective factor in the forming of the new man, in development of his character and personality in the process of military service, while proletarian internationalism became the foundation of the powerful fighting alliance of representatives of the more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups in the USSR.

As our society advances toward communism, its social structure becomes perfected. The root direction of this improvement is quantitative and qualitative growth of the worker class and enhancement of its role. This process is logically reflected in the armed forces. For example, in 1921 18 percent of military personnel were workers and 71 percent were peasants,

while by the middle of the 1930's these figures were 45.8 and 42.5 percent respectively. Today, at the stage of advanced socialism, workers comprise more than 60 percent of the population of the USSR (more than 82 percent together with white-collar workers), and peasants -- approximately 18 percent. Fully in conformity with this structure is the social composition both of the Armed Forces as a whole and of our officer corps. More than 82 percent of junior officers in the army and navy today are representatives of workers and employees, while approximately 17 percent represent the kolkhoz peasantry. It is notable that approximately 90 percent of officers and the overwhelming majority of all Armed Forces personnel are Communists and Komsomol members.

Improvement of the structure of Soviet society and consolidation of its social unity are taking place on a foundation of forming in the broad masses a scientific-materialist philosophical outlook and their indoctrination in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism. Consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist philosophical outlook in all areas of life and activities of our society is exerting decisive influence on the moral-political countenance of the Soviet fighting man. Due to the specific features of military service, the army and navy possess particularly favorable possibilities for organization of the entire business of indoctrination. Concentrated here are ideologically conditioned, mature, highly-qualified cadres, and a well-balanced party-political edifice system has been built. All conditions are present for teaching people thoroughly and comprehensively, for consistent implementation of ideological-political, military and moral indoctrination in a unified complex.

Our Armed Forces are an inseparable part of a new and historic community of people -- the Soviet people. Army and navy personnel live a common experience with the entire country, sharing the thoughts and aspirations of the toilers of city and village. Military labor, directed toward securing reliable defense of the achievements of socialism and the building of communism, constitutes a weighty contribution to the national cause of building a new society. Carrying out the responsible tasks of improving combat training and combat readiness, Soviet military personnel at the same time, as equal citizens of the USSR, actively participate in their country's political, governmental, civic and economic affairs.

The highly humane, noble significance of military activities, the people's recognition of its social significance and necessity, a situation of social equality and firm moral health which prevails in the army and navy, and daily all-encompassing organizational and ideological-indoctrinational work on the part of commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations -- all this ensures the effective and beneficent influence of military service on the development of the individual.

II.

Military organizational development is conducted in this country under the supervision of the Communist Party in a spirit of overall Soviet organizational development. The steadily increasing economic, scientific-technological and sociopolitical capabilities of our advanced socialist society are being successfully realized in the interests of reliable defense of its achievements. The country's powerful material and technological foundation, the achievements of Soviet science, and unprecedented flourishing of socialist culture have enabled our party to effect radical reforms in military affairs. These transformations in turn have resulted in qualitative changes in the character, content and conditions of military service. We are speaking not only of the professional aspect of things but also an increase in the social role and social responsibility of military personnel.

Qualitative changes in the character of military service are reflected in the new general military regulations, in conformity with which the daily lives and activities of military personnel are being organized today. Regulations also precisely specify the demands imposed on today's fighting man by service in the armed forces. He must possess many qualities which can be formed and developed only in the course of military service. These qualities are naturally developed on the basis of man's social practices preceding military service, the moral principles instilled in him by the family, the school, and the labor collective, on a foundation of a rising level of general cultural development of Soviet young people, and particularl y -- the level of general educational and technical training.

Thanks to the dynamic socioeconomic development of our society, remarkable qualitative changes are taking place in the countenance of Soviet fighting men. By 1939 approximately 12 percent of our army and navy cadres possessed higher and secondary education, 27.5 percent possessed incomplete secondary, while approximately 60.5 percent had received elementary schooling. By 1967, when the new law on universal military training was passed, approximately 46 percent of military personnel possessed higher and secondary education, 54 percent possessed incomplete secondary education, while the number of personnel with only elementary schooling comprised less than 1 percent. Approximately 70 percent of the young men entering the army and navy in 1974 possessed higher and secondary education. Today almost all military personnel possess higher, secondary or incomplete secondary education. The level of technical training of newly-inducted personnel has been rising rapidly, particularly in recent years. In 1924, for example, only 16 percent of inductees were trained in a technical specialty, while today more than 84 percent have worked in industry and agriculture and know various civilian trades. In addition, one out of every three inductees today possesses a military occupational specialty acquired at DOSAAF training organizations or at trade and technical schools.

Military service, mobilizing one's knowledge and energy, one's intellectual potential for attaining a high goal -- guarantee of the combat readiness and fighting efficiency of a subunit, unit, naval ship, and the Armed Forces as a whole, provides a powerful impetus toward further intellectual and physical improvement of the individual. The prerequisites for such improvement are dictated to an enormous degree by the fact that our army and navy have been provided with new weapons and equipment.

In the first place, this equipment has dictated qualitative changes in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces and has led to the development of a number of fundamentally new military technical specialties.

The scale of qualitative changes in this area is indicated by growth in the total number of military occupational specialties: from 160 during World War II to 400 at the beginning of the 1950's and to almost 2,000 today. This increase in the number of military technical specialties is being accompanied by a sharp increase in the complexity of the content of military labor. Many of today's military specialists work in the area of control and operation of modern automatic devices and mechanisms, which requires thorough knowledge of the fundamentals of a number of technical disciplines, thorough training in the area of mathematics, physics, radio electronics, chemistry, cybernetics, etc. At the same time the duration of service in the army and navy for inducted personnel has been shortened, and consequently there has been a sharp increase in the intensity of the training and indoctrination process, and the intellectual, psychological, and physical workloading on each and every man, which accelerates the process of forming and development of the individual.

In the second place, maintenance and operation of modern weapons and combat equipment are of a sharply-expressed collective character. The precise distribution of service-combat duties connected with this, absolute subordination of the will of each to the will of the one-man commander, the necessity of smooth, well-coordinated actions, and a high degree of responsibility for the assigned job -- all these in their aggregate constitute fertile soil for the development of collectivism, loyalty to civic duty, friendship and comradeship, self-sacrifice, and other character traits.

Third, modern weapons and combat equipment have substantially altered the correlation of physical and intellectual labor expended in the process of military service. For example, 90% of the working time of a duty radar operator involves performance of control and monitoring functions. Such functions occupy an increasingly important place in the activities of many other specialists in all branches of the Armed Forces.

At the same time modern weapons, which have sharply increased the scale, intensity and complexity of combat activities, also impose extraordinarily high demands on the physical qualities of a fighting man, on his mobility and capability for extended total effort.

The high degree of combat readiness of army and navy under present-day conditions has acquired more important social significance than ever before. The Armed Forces of the USSR are called upon, as was noted by L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, to guard the peaceful labor of the people and to serve as a bulwark of world peace. Performance of military duty demands of an individual excellent moral-political, fighting and psychological qualities. Such qualities are developed, consolidated and perfected in the process of military service.

III.

Comprehensive development of the individual in the process of military service is secured by the continuous influence of many interlinked factors. One of the most important is party political work, which encompasses all areas of Armed Forces life and activities, unifies personnel around the CPSU and mobilizes them for flawless performance of duty and a steady increase in combat readiness.

Party political work in the army and navy is conducted under the direct supervision of the CPSU. In all its forms and methods it is directed toward resolving the tasks of ideological-political indoctrination of personnel, toward forming a Communist philosophical outlook in personnel, toward securing troop combat and operational training, strengthening military discipline, and extensive development of socialist competition.

A typical feature of contemporary army and navy life is a steady growth in the influence of party-political work on processes taking place in the Armed Forces. This growth reflects a logical strengthening of the party's leadership role in our society and in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

There are full-fledged primary party organizations in all units and on all ships, the vigorous activities of which are unifying the military collectives and mobilizing them for high-quality performance of tasks.

Comprehensive development of the individual in the process of military service is promoted in an effective manner by the entire structure of life in the army and navy. Strict procedures according to regulations, precise organization of the teaching and indoctrination process, service activities, and combat alert duty, firm regimentation of all military personnel activities in conformity with field manuals and regulations, a precise daily regimen and military rituals -- all this and many other factors have a positive influence on the fighting man and promote development of discipline, efficiency and responsibility.

Socialist competition exerts a direct influence on growth of civic consciousness in personnel and development of an active life position. The experience of the top units, combined units, and naval ships indicates that skillful utilization of the enormous potential of competition by its organizers -- commanders, as well as political officers and party organizations, plays an important role in the ideological and moral improvement of military

personnel. These capabilities are revealed and implemented in the course of the campaign to meet socialist pledges, when standards of Communist attitude toward labor and high principles of selfless mutual assistance are being confirmed, as well as in the assessment of results, which should be objective to a maximum degree and reflect actual achievements and the true state of affairs in the subunit, unit, and on the naval ship.

In addition to elements connected with service, of importance in shaping the individual are off-duty contacts in the collective, particularly relationships of comradeship and soldier friendship, barracks traditions and customs. Experience indicates that wherever the commander -- the organizer and director of training and indoctrination of his subordinates -- is constantly concerned with securing a highly-cultured leisure time for his personnel, in conformity with the present countenance of the fighting man, organization and discipline are stronger, and results in combat and political training are better.

Thoughtful, skillful organization of active leisure time recreation which, according to the apt definition of Karl Marx, serves as "space" for the comprehensive development of the individual, promotes not only restoration of the physical and spiritual forces of the fighting man but also increases them, constituting an important means of development of those qualities and propensities which do not find an outlet in military service activities.

Nor can one overrate the significance for development of the individual of a healthy moral atmosphere in the subunit, unit, and naval ship, grounded on the principles of communist ideology and morality and on strict fulfillment of the demands of field manuals, military regulations, and orders. Although cases of an unfriendly attitude, dishonesty, mutual cover-up, and lack of respect for the individual are rare, they should receive an appropriate, highly-principled and uncompromising response by commanders, political officers and party organizations. Resolute elimination of such behavior is an essential condition for a high degree of solidarity of the military collective. Constituting the nucleus element of the socialist army and an active combat unit, the military collective possesses great potential in indoctrination of personnel. And this potential is realized more fully if a commander is well-equipped with the ability to organize the activities of the collective in a correct manner, from a party position and on a scientific basis. The most important concern of commanders, political officers, and party organizations is the forming and development in the collective of healthy public opinion and skilled management of the collective with the aid of party and Komsomol activists, and the conduct of diversified group and collective measures in an organic combination with continuous work with individuals.

It is precisely in the collective and through the collective that the fighting man forms an active life position, an excellent ideological-political and moral-fighting qualities. "Daily life and routine, the relationships which are formed in the unit," stated M. I. Kalinin, "developing into specified forms, are consolidated in life and serve the cause of indoctrination."

Without question a primary role in realization of the indoctrinational influence of military service is played by Soviet military cadres, and particularly command cadres. Active implementers of party policy in the army and navy, officers carry into the soldier masses the party's ideas, tirelessly conduct political work, train and indoctrinate their subordinates, and serve for them as an example of morality, discipline, general good breeding and dedication to duty.

The officer corps comprises the foundation, the backbone of the army and navy. Together with the development of Soviet society and our Armed Forces, it is steadily improving qualitatively. The percentage share of engineer and technician personnel is steadily growing. Today 45% of officer slots are occupied by engineers and technicians. On the whole approximately one half of our officers possess military higher education and specialized military education.

Highly-educated, comprehensively developed Soviet officers, possessing broad political and cultural knowledge, are genuine mentors of their subordinates. Training and indoctrinating their men, organizing and guiding the performance of military service by their subordinates, they are training not simply specialists in military affairs, but are training highly-aware, morally and physically conditioned individuals.

Experience in building socialism and communism in our country as well as all of today's Soviet realities persuasively attest to the fact that military service is an important stage in the forming and development of the personality of the Soviet citizen -- the builder and defender of a new society, who is deeply aware of his own personal responsibility for the fate of the homeland and who possesses the willingness, volition and ability to carry out with dignity and honor his civic and citizen's duty in any sector of the building of communism.

3024

CSO: 1801

MILITARY COMMISSARIAT DRAFTS ACTIVE DUTY SOLDIER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by Col A. Drovosekov: "Fedot, But the Wrong One"]

[Text] What can a person do whose job includes being in charge of summons, registration and induction forms at the military commissariat? He can do quite a bit. For example, he can summon citizen Sidorov or Petrov, when necessary, to appear on a certain day and at a certain time. However... he can also demand the appearance of a person who at that time is in active military service far from his home town.

I would imagine there would be objections at this point. That couldn't possibly happen, you say. Very strict and precise records are kept at the military commissariat. They know who is where at any given time.

In principle this is true. Therefore at first there was disbelief that, for example, personnel at the Leninskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in the city of Vil'nyus could issue an appearance summons to somebody who is already on active duty in the military.

In May of this year this military commissariat inducted Valeriy Bespalov into the Soviet Army. His parents are receiving letters from him for a period of 2 months, and suddenly a special-delivery summons to appear arrives. The young soldier's parents read the summons and smiled. How could their son report to the military commissariat if he was already serving in the army, and particularly stationed in another republic? The soldier's mother explained the situation to the person who had delivered the summons.

It would seem that the misunderstanding would be grasped and the error corrected. But this was not the case. Some time passed, and another summons arrived. This time the soldier's parents were rather upset. Had something happened to their son? There must be good reason why he would be summoned to appear at the military commissariat.

The Bespalovs discussed the matter and immediately wrote a letter to their son, asking him to let them know how he was. They forwarded the summons to prove that their concern was not without cause.

They received an immediate reply. Valeriy wrote his parents not to worry, that everything was fine, that he was still stationed at the same place.

The Bepalovs sighed with relief. But soon a messenger appeared with another summons. They had to phone the military commissariat to stop this waste of summons forms. This was to no avail. To make a long story short, the next summons, instructing Valeriy Yevgen'yevich Bepalov to report to the military commissariat at 1400 hours on 16 November for a preinduction medical examination, was forwarded by Valeriy's uncle to us here at the newspaper. The letter contained the following question: please explain to us how this can be happening? The military commissariat has sent several summonses to this young man, without inquiring on a single occasion why he failed to appear.

I was intrigued by this question. I called the number indicated on the summons. Maj I. Kalmatavichus who, as I learned from my conversation with him, was the officer who had summoned Bepalov to appear, could not give me an answer. He merely explained that he had summoned Bepalov not as an inductee but as a person subject to future military service.

A more detailed conversation took place the following day with Major Kalmatavichus's assistant -- Sr Lt Z. Skinzer. He confirmed that Valeriy was indeed serving in the army. The mix-up had happened because there was another Bepalov.

"Everything identical?"

"The first name, patronymic and last name are the same. The only difference is place of birth and place of residence."

So there was a difference. Who was to blame for the mix-up? Can it be so difficult to distinguish one Bepalov from another, if one pays attention to what one is doing?

I was unable to obtain a clear-cut answer to these questions in the ensuing debate with Skinzer. I must assume that eventually everything will be sorted out at the commissariat and that they will determine who is primarily to blame: the person who makes out the summonses to appear or the person who gives instructions to issue a summons.

But these are details. The important thing is that the military commissariat will no longer cause this soldier's parents unwarranted concern. Comrade Skinzer gave us his assurances.

3024
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REPORT AND ELECTION MEETINGS OF KOMSOMOL ORGANIZATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Dec 76 p 2

[Article: "Komsomol Report and Election Meetings"]

[Text] The status of report and election meetings of Army and Navy Komsomol organizations was discussed at the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Participating in this conference were the first deputy chiefs of the political administrations of the Armed Forces branches, officials from the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the Komsomol affairs assistants of the political administration chiefs of the Armed Forces branches. A report on progress in reports and elections in Navy Komsomol organizations was presented by Rear Adm N. V. Usenko, First Deputy Chief of the Navy Political Directorate.

It was noted during the discussion that the reports and elections are being held in an atmosphere of great youth political enthusiasm evoked by the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress. Komsomol members are enthusiastically discussing the results of work performed in the period under review. They are universally expressing support for the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet Government and are expressing strong approval of the decisions of the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The demands of the 25th CPSU Congress to step up ideological-political, labor and moral indoctrination of Komsomol members and other young people are being extensively discussed at the meetings, and they are analyzing progress in carrying out the recommendations of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy pertaining to organization and conduct of the Leninist test entitled "Implement the Resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress!", progress in the review of the performance of primary Komsomol organizations on carrying out the resolutions of the party congress and competition for the privilege of signing the Lenin Komsomol report to the CPSU Central Committee in honor of the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

The center of Komsomol member attention is focused on matters pertaining to ensuring that Komsomol members and other young military personnel set an example in combat training and service, in strengthening military discipline,

and in increasing the activeness and initiative of Komsomol organizations in successful performance of the tasks assigned by the USSR Minister of Defense for the new training year.

On the whole the Komsomol reports and elections are accompanied by an increase in the organizer role of Komsomol committees and bureaus in mobilizing Komsomol members and other young people to implement the historic resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and to achieve additional success in the new training year.

At the same time it was noted at the conference that a number of substantial deficiencies in this area were revealed in the course of verification of the first stage of Komsomol reports and elections.

The content of Komsomol work and its effectiveness in the ideological-political indoctrination of young military personnel are not being thoroughly and deeply analyzed at all meetings. There is insufficient analysis of the forms and methods of Komsomol work pertaining to dissemination and study of the Leninist ideological-theory legacy. The demands of the party congress pertaining to stepping up moral indoctrination of youth and the resolutions of the Fifth Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee on this matter are not always taken into consideration in preparing for these meetings.

Some places there has been somewhat of a narrowing of the diversity of forms and methods of Komsomol work. Little attention is devoted to organization of intelligent, cultured spending of military personnel leisure time.

Sometimes the reports do a poor job of examining the organizational role of Komsomol organization secretaries and bureaus, as well as of Komsomol activists in attaining an excellent personal example by each and every Komsomol member in combat and political training and in military discipline.

The holding of reports and elections coincided with discussion of the results of exchange of Komsomol membership cards, which on the whole was completed in an organized manner in army and navy units. At some meetings, however, there is little examination of the influence of the Komsomol card exchange on raising the level of activities within Komsomol and improving individual work with Komsomol members.

As was noted at the conference, the organizational and ideological level of Komsomol report-election meetings is higher and their influence on the state of work within Komsomol is more effective when political officers and party organizations keep a close eye on this important matter. Unfortunately there are still cases where political officers and party organizations have failed to show proper party-minded interest in supervision of the reports and elections, who have failed to exercise daily influence on preparations for and the conduct of each and every Komsomol meeting, and who have failed to ensure the effective participation of party members in the proceedings of these meetings.

The conference noted that the Komsomol reports and meetings have now entered the final and most critical stage, when Komsomol meetings will be held in regimental and ship organizations. They will make it possible to re-analyze the performance of Komsomol members and to assess its strong and weak points. Although considerable work has been accomplished, there is much unutilized reserve potential and opportunities. We must proceed precisely from this at the present time, in the concluding phase of the report and election campaign.

The task consists in closely linking questions of ideological-political, military, and moral indoctrination of young people with performance of the tasks of combat and political training, and strengthening of military discipline. It is necessary that all means of Komsomol influence supplement the existing system of political and military indoctrination. For this it is necessary to delve more deeply into the needs and concerns of Komsomol members, to know what young people are thinking and what their concerns are. We must work hard to ensure that from the very first days of the new training year the activeness and role of Komsomol organizations, each individual Komsomol member and young soldier are raised to an even higher level in the campaign for quality and effectiveness of combat training. We must make every effort to strengthen the influence of Komsomol organizations on young people in this matter. It is also important in the final phase of the report-election campaign to focus attention on organizational matters, on matters of activities within Komsomol. We must constantly seek to strengthen Komsomol cadres, and it is time to think about forms of training for newly-elected Komsomol activists and to step up work with Communists elected to Komsomol supervisory bodies.

The reports and elections are supposed to raise all Komsomol work to a higher level and to mobilize Komsomol members and other young people to accomplish in a high-quality manner the tasks of combat and political training, and to achieve further strengthening of military discipline in every subunit, unit and on every naval ship.

The results of the conference were summarized by Lt Gen M. G. Sobolev, Deputy Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

3024

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EDITORIAL STRESSES NEED FOR DISCIPLINARY WORK WITH CONSTRUCTION TROOPS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Dec 76 p 1

[Editorial: "Discipline of Military Construction Troops"]

[Text] The year is coming to an end. This is a period of intense activity for military construction personnel. Guided by the decisions of the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and by the points and conclusions contained in the address at the Plenum by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, they are making every effort to complete with honor the first year of the 10th Five-Year Plan, to ensure prompt completion of construction projects, to meet construction targets and socialist pledges, and to establish the requisite amount of construction in progress for the coming year. Precise organization of production and excellent military and labor discipline assume exceptional importance under these conditions.

As we know, Soviet military discipline is based on a high degree of political consciousness on the part of military personnel, a deep awareness of their patriotic duty and the international tasks of our people, as well as on their total dedication to the homeland, the Communist Party and Soviet Government. This also applies in full measure to military construction personnel. Wherever military discipline is strong, there is always high labor productivity, successful and high-quality completion of production targets.

Excellent work results for a number of years now have been produced by the military construction unit under the command of Lt Col I. Soshnev. The unit's achievements are grounded on firm military discipline and precise, skilled organization of labor. Through the joint efforts of the commanding officer, the party and Komsomol organizations, a moral atmosphere has been established in this unit whereby any deviations from the demands of regulations, orders and instructions have become intolerable.

The commanders of military construction units and subunits are working persistently and purposefully to improve the discipline of personnel and to strengthen the procedure laid down by regulations. There still occur among

military construction troops, however, instances of violation of labor and military discipline. Some personnel show a careless attitude toward labor, go AWOL, and drink alcohol to excess. In some units there have been cases of mutual protection and other immoral phenomena. Cases of violation of discipline are usually noted where commanders are insufficiently demanding, do little to prevent infractions and fail to analyze their causes. Deficiencies of this kind are to be found in particular in the military construction detachment under the command of Maj V. Uvarov. In this detachment indoctrinational work is very weak, political instruction classes are held on an irregular basis, and there occur cases of tactless handling of subordinates. Such practices fail to promote instillment of a conscientious attitude toward military duty.

Ideological conviction and a communist philosophical outlook constitute for personnel on military construction projects, as for all Soviet military personnel, an inexhaustible source of spiritual strength, directing them, just like a compass, in the phenomena and processes of societal affairs, and helping them determine proper behavior corresponding to the interests of the job at hand. Consolidation of this philosophical outlook should be effectively promoted by political instruction classes, lectures, discussions, visual aids, and the entire arsenal of propaganda devices and mass cultural events. It is essential to utilize in full measure, for indoctrination purposes, the substantial opportunities of Saturday, which is designated for the political, drill and technical training of military construction troops.

Socialist competition which, as was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress, exerts profound influence on practical housekeeping activities, on socio-political affairs and on the moral atmosphere, constitutes an effective means of increasing the conscientiousness and discipline of construction workers. It is important in every unit to secure in deed the Leninist principles of competition: publicity, comparability of results, and the opportunity to emulate advanced know-how. It is essential more extensively to develop the creative activeness of people and the Communist labor movement, in which 50% of the personnel of construction units are presently participating.

A decisive condition for discipline and proper procedure as laid down by regulations is constant commander demandingness. This is what welds together the ranks, focuses efforts on vigorous performance of assigned tasks and makes it possible to prevent offenses and infractions. As is stated in the Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the commander is obliged to combine high demandingness and high principledness, as well as an implacable attitude toward shortcomings, with trust in and respect for his men, constant concern for them, avoiding rudeness and injuring the feelings of others. A combination of demandingness and concern for others is an important factor in strengthening discipline. Unfortunately some commanders of construction units sometimes define demandingness in a one-sided manner, believing that all means are acceptable for the purpose of ensuring procedures according to regulations. Sometimes commanders are

rude to their men and give them a dressing down instead of serious, businesslike demandingness on a daily basis. Such things are intolerable.

All efforts aimed at maintaining firm discipline among military construction personnel should proceed from the demands of military regulations and should be carried out taking into consideration the specific features of construction subunits and the features of their labor. There are many such features. Military construction personnel are frequently the first to move into remote areas, work in small groups, and experience difficulties connected with a temporary lack of facilities and the scattered nature of work sites. This places a special responsibility on commanders and political workers and obliges them to be attentive toward their men, with a paternal concern for their needs and requests. In those units where command personnel, alongside matters pertaining to production, constantly bear in mind matters dealing with living conditions, and organization of all subunit activities strictly according to regulations, the men are cheerful, put in shock-worker labor, with highly-effective and flawless work performance.

Strengthening of organization and discipline in construction units is promoted by purposeful efforts on the part of party and Komsomol organizations. They must seek to achieve a vanguard role for Communists and Komsomol members in labor, fulfillment of the demands of military regulations and maintenance of military discipline, expanding their influence to all aspects of activities in the military unit, and vigorously campaigning to eliminate the occurrence of accidents and immoral behavior.

A high degree of organization and discipline is a guarantee of efficient labor and successful meeting of production schedules by military construction personnel and fulfillment of their duty to the homeland.

3024

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DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES OF SOME COMMANDERS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by Col Yu. Kamalov: "Strictness and Care"]

[Text] The notice which appeared in the 27 August 1976 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was quite small. It was entitled "Ahead of Schedule" and related the successful performance of top proficiency-rated Sr Lt N. Komlev. I read the meager lines in the newspaper, and before my eyes stood a tall, lean lieutenant, nervously puffing on a cigarette. That is how I remembered Komlev from 4 years ago, following a service conference. At that time the unit commander had reprimanded him for personal lack of organization and for taking the easy way out in combat training.

The young officer had been quite upset with the punishment imposed. He felt that this was the end of his officer's "career." Strange as it may seem, he blamed not so much himself for what had happened as the operators under his command. "You go through a long explanation and lecture, and they sit down at the scope and cannot tell target from interference," he stated.

In time Komlev came to realize that he had been punished for his own deficiencies. He was assisted in this by his commanding officer, his senior comrades, his fellow lieutenants, and the highly principled position they took. There were no superfluous reminders about previous omissions, nor were there expressions of sympathy. Each individual endeavored to help the lieutenant recognize his mistakes and to correct them.

Lieutenant Komlev left the unit a completely different person. And of course it was nice to see that in the unit they had both been able to place strict demandingness on the young officer and to give him support during a difficult period of development.

I also became acquainted with the experience of other military units, where the commanders skillfully and intelligently utilize such an indoctrinational measure as punishment. They go deeply into the motivations leading an officer or warrant officer to commit an offense or infraction and carefully

weigh the punishment, if punishment is necessary. The most important thing, they make every effort to ensure that a misdeed is corrected as quickly as possible.

Experienced commanders are willing to spend time on one-on-one talks with those who have made mistakes and hear them out at officer meetings. They focus all indoctrinational effort on convincing the wrongdoer that remission of punishment depends primarily on him. Only through persistent labor can he restore his good name in the eyes of his comrades. In addition, continuous monitoring is instituted on those who violate military regulations, and greater demandingness is imposed on them. All this promotes prompt correction of errors and sure commander development.

Unfortunately some commanders poorly utilize the indoctrinational force of punishment. Fairly recently I encountered the following incident.

An antiaircraft missile battalion was to go out to the gunnery range to take part in a tactical exercise involving live fire. Suddenly the intercept controller fell ill. The battalion commander, who had recently taken over command of that unit, was inclined to replace him with Lt N. Yegorov. Yegorov assured his commanding officer that he would not let him down. But the battalion executive officer, Capt N. Shnitser, who was present, reminded the commanding officer that Yegorov had been punished for an infraction. They decided that another intercept controller would go out to the range.

The battalion successfully accomplished its mission, receiving a high mark. Judging just from the end result of the combat training exercises, everything had been done correctly in the subunit. But how about from a pedagogic, indoctrinational point of view? Both this time and later, when the battalion executive officer failed to include Yegorov among those praised for their performance at an exercise (he deserved praise), in my opinion he was making a serious mistake.

Lieutenant Yegorov was punished a year ago. But there was not a single service conference or officer meeting at which he was not reminded of the reprimand. Gradually a far from flattering opinion was formed of him. And yet following the official reprimand the officer had drawn the proper conclusions and became more demanding on himself. During that year he did not receive a single admonition for deficient performance; on the contrary, Yegorov's men always demonstrated a high degree of performance smoothness and skill. He himself displayed zeal and activeness. The lack of confidence shown toward him was in effect another punishment.

A number of deficiencies were found in this battalion which diminished the indoctrinational role of reprimands and punishment. It would seem that both Captain Shnitser and the other officers are well aware that disciplinary authorities are granted to commanders for the purpose of increasing in their subordinates a sense of responsibility for the assigned task. In actual practice, however, they commit violations of established procedure and rules.

In order to increase the indoctrinational effect of an imposed punishment or reprimand, as a rule they widely publicize the incident among the appropriate category of unit or subunit personnel. But under no circumstances should this be abused, as was the case with Lieutenant Yegorov. Otherwise there may come a time when the good intention of once again focusing attention on a previous deficiency will evoke a totally opposite reaction in a person.

It is no simple matter to determine the time when one can and should remit a punishment as having performed its indoctrinational function. There are no unequivocal timetables here; they are determined in each specific instance. For example, in my opinion they could have remitted the punishment of Lieutenant Yegorov prior to the gunnery range exercise. But Captain Shnitser is of the opinion that by that time he had not yet sufficiently demonstrated that he had changed. But is the captain always so strict and demanding on his subordinates, and consequently on himself as well? It turns out that he is not.

For example, Lt S. Tsoy was given a punishment for acts of omission in his work and for lack of personal discipline. But three months later Captain Shnitser remitted the punishment. Could it be that the lieutenant had already corrected his deficiencies? No, things in the platoon under his command had not improved at all, and the officer himself had done nothing to demonstrate that he had come around. Then why was his punishment remitted? The explanation is quite simple: the time had come to recommend him for his next promotion in rank.

Such inconsistency and at times unwarranted decisions in disciplinary practice undermine the indoctrinational influence of punishment and nullify its mobilizing role. Precisely this explains the fact that only 2 months after remission of the punishment, the party bureau was forced to look into the case of now Senior Lieutenant Tsoy.

I have not cited these examples for the purpose of heaping additional criticism on Captain Shnitser. He realized the error of his ways in the course of our conversation. I wanted to demonstrate with his mistakes how important it is to utilize one's disciplinary authority intelligently in the interests of the cause of indoctrination of subordinates.

3024
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VEHICLE REPAIR ENTERPRISE TESTS NEW COMPREHENSIVE QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEM

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by A. Tertychnyy: "The Birth of Know-How -- Repair Workers at the N Enterprise Double the Life of the Vehicles"]

[Text] Each year dozens of different delegations visit the repair enterprise managed by Col-Engr F. Lyuksyutov. They come to learn, and the enterprise does have things to offer. The collective works with good rhythm and overfulfills its plans. But the main thing is that they have doubled the life of vehicles repaired at their enterprise.

How were the repair workers able to do this? There is one factor that explains their success better than any other: the creation of a comprehensive control system for quality of repair. The essence of the innovation is the establishment of a set of enterprise standards which give a precise structure to the interaction of all subdivisions in repair work.

The repair workers did not erect their multilayered system all at once. Especially when they had to begin almost from scratch. The enthusiasm of the innovators -- that is where they began the "construction" three years ago. The plant director was perhaps one of the first in the collective to see the merits of the at-that-time little-known know-how of the L'vov workers who had set up a system for quality control of output. Many specialists approved of his proposal to set up such a system at their own enterprise.

A commission for introduction of innovations was organized. The members were experienced engineers Yu. Radin, N. Makarov, V. Tikhovskiy, F. Karkach, L. Kiyanovskiy, Ye. Mazur, G. Sanovskiy, and V. Yavdak. The group of innovators visited one of the auto plants where the L'vov know-how was already being applied. This trip was helpful, but most things had to be worked out independently. At that time, of course, no repair plant had attempted to implement a systems approach in solving the problem of raising the quality of output.

A comprehensive system can only "take root" where production is on a fairly high technical level. Therefore, just the raising of the question

of introducing the system required that the collective carry out a series of organizational and technical steps. First of all came redesigning the enterprise. They began with a seemingly secondary matter, the storage of spare parts. During vehicle repair dozens of the most varied parts have to be replaced. The warehouse has hundreds of boxes, and sometimes it was difficult to find the needed spare part quickly. But after the warehouse area was expanded and electric stackers were installed the necessary parts began to reach the shop in a few minutes.

For a long time the most unpleasant job at the plant was washing. Working with dirty parts and the caustic solution used to wash vehicles coming in for repair is not a pleasant business. And there were few who wanted to do it. Parts were poorly washed. But if mud or sand is left on the surface of parts, we know, it leads to defects later.

Everyone said that a washing machine was needed. But when it arrived at the enterprise the workers who were to operate it did not trust it at first. The machine was not at all like those they had seen at other enterprises. It was an experimental model built by one of the institutes. Of course, the collective was taking a certain risk by being the first to test it under production conditions. Some features of it had to be refined immediately. But introduction of the new washer produced better results than expected. Labor productivity in this section rose sharply and working conditions became much better.

Other possible causes of poor-quality work were also taken care of at the enterprise. But, of course, defective work may have its origin outside too. The cause is often the supplier of spare parts or equipment. Therefore, the repair workers established stricter "incoming" control. For example, once the enterprise where P. Lobach and officer G. Gavrilovich are managers delivered many parts which deviated from standards. A timely check of the incoming parts and equipment helped prevent defective work. And the suppliers, sensing the high standards of the repair workers, soon made significant improvements in the quality of their products. This created the basis for meeting the main requirement of the comprehensive system: to conduct repair work on a technical level appropriate to state standards.

One of the chief advantages of the new system is the fact that it has helped give a graphic picture of the results of the collective's labor. Formerly the results of competition were summed up as follows: the shop head would rise and say "Comrade Petrov is working well, but Comrade Ivanov is doing poorly." It was a pretty subjective evaluation. The constant gathering of data on the quality indices of the work of enterprise subdivisions helps avoid that today, and all the factors that influence the quality of repair are taken into account. It immediately becomes clear who has worked his hardest and who has not. The workers have a greater interest in the quality of their output. It is not chance that one out of five repair workers has earned the right to use a personal stamp. The collective has begun to certify assemblies for the plant mark of quality. The enterprise technical control section has begun working more precisely too. An operational control card file has been established to order the work of engineering-technical personnel.

This makes it possible to keep track of performance of the enterprise director's orders and assignments and the directives of higher-ranking bodies.

Great credit for the successful operation of the system goes to the enterprise party committee. A. Volgushev is secretary. The active posture of communists helped them overcome many difficulties standing in the way of the innovation, especially the habit of working in the old way. Thus, the shop headed by M. Lavoshnikov did not receive spare parts on time. According to the new system the shop chief was supposed to submit a complaint to the supply division but he did not do so for fear of spoiling relations with workers there. Formerly this turn of events would have resulted in a delay in repair, but it would have been difficult to determine who was to blame. With the system everything was revealed very quickly. The needed parts were sent to the shop and the article was repaired in time.

Experience suggests that with time the comprehensive system will cover all production and supply agencies which are tied into a single economic assembly. This will make it possible to increase the life of vehicles received by the troops from other repair enterprises too, by two and three times. The experience of this leading collective guarantees it.

11,176
CSO: 1801

MAINTAINING HIGH MORALE AT CENTRAL ASIAN DESERT GARRISON

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen A. Taskayev, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Garrison in the Desert"]

[Text] I looked at the map. The garrison, my destination, appeared to be about 10 kilometers off. Although I was far from a newcomer to these parts and had seen a lot, still I thought with sympathy of the men who serve their difficult tours of duty there.

It is hard for inhabitants of the central regions to imagine the trials faced by the defenders of our country's southern borders. The sun blazes down mercilessly for more than half the year: if you put an egg out in the open it will cook immediately. The temperature inside motor vehicles rises to 70 degrees and more. Then there is the sand which goes everywhere, especially during a wild "Afghan" wind. Then there is the rationed amount of warm drinking water which is brought in in tanks. And there is nowhere to hide from the baking, ruthless sun...

Imagine my surprise when, amid the yellow, fairy-tale silence, there arose before me a picturesque oasis. A green tunnel (there is no other way to describe this tree-lined lane) runs from the main checkpoint in. Once past the gates you see an obelisk in honor of the 30th anniversary of Victory over Fascist Germany. Closer to headquarters is a monument to V. I. Lenin. Graphic agitation material is tastefully done and well located. It consists of portraits of the best fighting men. Well within the post, in the shadow of the trees, there is a summer movie theater (with a wide screen) and a fine soldiers' tearoom. Now that is the desert for you!

Yes, there in the middle of the desert full, vital life goes forward. This military collective is one of the best in the district. A prestigious commission from Moscow visited them not long ago. According to the results of the inspection 50 percent of the subunits earned the right to the honorable title of outstanding. Almost 70 percent of the personnel are specialists 1st and 2nd class, and that includes all the

communists. The creative work of efficiency workers is rewarded with certificates and monetary bonuses. But the most remarkable thing is the special pride which the men take in their garrison.

The secretary of the party bureau showed us a letter from Leonid Popov with a request to be accepted for extended service. After discharge into the reserve he had lived and worked for 18 months in his home area, in Dnepropetrovskaya Oblast. Then he returned to the garrison. Plainly, he missed his home unit.

This is not a unique case. Gennadiy Yefizov is another who lived less than a year away from the garrison before returning. That is how Stanislav Shcherbatiy became an ensign. Komsomol members Yuriy Shchigorev and Rafael' Il'murzin announced their desire to remain immediately upon completion of their regular terms of service.

Some will be puzzled: why does this remote garrison have such an attraction for those who have served just one or two years in it? If it were Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, or Minsk it would be understandable. But the desert...

Perhaps it is precisely the romance of long hard days that makes it attractive? Probably so, but that is not all. Above all, they are kept by the full, vital life of the collective, a group whose skeleton is old-timers such as communists Lt Col Sotnikov, majors V. Golovnya, V. Volkov, and A. Khrabro, captains Ye. Lebedev and V. Kondik, and Ensign S. Shcherbatyy. They are almost all members of the party bureau. Everything that gladdens the eye, warms the heart, and inspires the imagination in this garrison lost amid the sand shows the guiding will, inspiring example, and inexhaustible initiative of the commander and the communists.

Concern for new officers and ensigns is paramount in this garrison. These men usually have little experience of life, have not had time to begin families, and are inexperienced in handling free time and money. Their wants are substantial (sometimes surpassing local opportunities). In short, they must be surrounded by attention from the very first day so that they do not feel themselves to be temporary, just "serving out their time."

How do the party activists handle this problem? It is impossible to give a definitive answer. All that is clear is that the main influence on a person there is the moral climate which has become established in the collective.

The organization of everyday life and leisure time is more important in remote desert garrisons than anywhere else. Here is why. When an officer receives an assignment to a remote garrison he cannot help but wonder what awaits him there. Frankly, some are overcome by gloomy thoughts such as: what kind of living conditions will my family have? But when

he arrives there is a modern, city-type apartment waiting for him. He can watch television; there are three channels. The garrison has a good library. The post is lush with vegetation. The irrigation ditches murmur...

This is just one side of things, of course. The other is that the newcomer enters a collective which lives an engaging cultural life, where, for example, everyone from the secretary of the party bureau to preschool children participates in amateur theatricals. Every holiday they have a "blue fire" [literal rendition of unknown colloquial phrase]. Once or twice a month there are readers conferences. Trips to the republic center and to theaters, museums, and exhibitions are organized a couple of times a month too.

They show great concern for fixing up the post and taking care of the planting and gardens. They work the vineyard, melon patch, orchard, and garden with their own hands. Each year they gather (their own!) harvest of 30 tons of melons and about 3,000 tons of grapes. An area for children was recently set up at the initiative of the women's council. The event would seem to be unimportant, but how they treated it was important. The play area was opened with a ceremony. At the conclusion of it a soccer game between the fathers and their children was held. The little ones won, of course. They were given an enormous cake as a prize.

The contribution of the commander, political workers, and party organization is that they are able to find an approach which evokes collective interest in even the most seemingly ordinary matter. And it is this, I would say, which yields their careful, solicitous attitude toward material and nonmaterial assets, toward everything that people live with, that surrounds them.

One can only regret that this approach to creating proper conditions for study, life, and everyday affairs, to strengthening military collectives, has not taken root yet among all our remote garrisons. This is possibly the explanation for certain unpleasant facts.

A great deal is being done in the district to see that the conditions of combat training and everyday life at all garrisons are up to date. Through the efforts of military construction workers and units obsolete facilities have been replaced with remarkable motor pools and training centers, well-organized dormitories, hotels, soldiers barracks, messhalls, and cultural and educational institutions and artesian wells have been put into operation. But new construction by itself is not everything. For their part, the people must want to improve everyday life and take good care of everything that has been built with such labor.

In the unit where Maj N. Shmorgun serves, for example, residential buildings and dormitories for officers were recently put into use. The unit also had good physical facilities for training. But the new sites

are unrecognizable today. One forms the impression that the collective of tank soldiers has been negligent in keeping up training facilities and housing which were considered the best in our district.

The principal reason is that the commander, his deputy for political affairs, and the party committee have not shown the requisite activism, persistence, and thoughtfulness in their work to unify the military collective and instill pride in the unit. In large part this is because certain officers have taken a passive attitude toward their duties.

For example, if we look at the party committee's plans we do not sense a lack of activities. But the committee is plainly attracted to activities which appear effective superficially but are not so under the conditions of the particular garrison. The scale of the plan's interests is such that activists simply do not reach the individual soldier, or even the company. Yet this is exactly where the center of all political education work should be. There is also a "second front" in ideological education, one which is becoming increasingly important. This is the serviceman's family and their concerns.

Many factors determine the stability of a collective living in a remote garrison and the level of its success in combat training. Probably the most important factor is a healthy climate in the subunit, business-like, comradely relations between the leaders and the subordinates. Unfortunately, the party committee underestimates this factor. For example, consider the following instance. There are several lieutenants in the unit who have served just a few months but have already received reprimands. Most of them were given for mistakes which the new officers made out of inexperience. Such an approach to educating new officers leads to cold formality in relations among officers and introduces the factor of nervousness into the collective.

At the report and election party meeting the members of the party committee, in particular communists Lt Col A. Taratuto and Maj V. Duyun, were justly criticized for neglecting individual educational work with new officers and not teaching them to feel they are responsible for the garrison. The men do not know the history of the garrison and its revolutionary and combat traditions well. But they are truly heroic traditions. This garrison was one of the first to welcome the Great October Revolution and take the side of the revolution. Many Heroes of the Soviet Union and prominent military leaders began their military service there. In short, the garrison has excellent opportunities for educating new officers. But unfortunately, neither the party organization nor the Komsomol is doing any work in this direction.

Two garrisons in the desert. In one the living and training conditions are harder but success in combat and political training is better. In the other these conditions are more favorable but the achievements are unimpressive. The conclusion is easy to draw. Where the commander and party organization skillfully organize their work to unify the collective and where community interests are important to the men they look upon the harsh desert garrison as their home and work more actively and productively in training and in all public life.

WORK MEETINGS MUST BE EFFECTIVE: PURPOSEFUL, SHORT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Remizov: "The Efficiency of the Service Meeting"]

[Text] "Officers, report to the wardroom!" This announcement came over the loudspeakers almost every 90-120 minutes. We attended several of these assemblies; they might be called "operations meetings." The first thing we were struck by was the fact that each time the officers were slower to show up and their interest was less. Executive officer Capt-Lt V. Molochayev greeted each latecomer with a cutting look and some corresponding remark such as "Would you like us to send for you personally, Kulinich?" The executive officer even promised to punish one officer "the next time." The "next time" was not long in coming. Just an hour later the command was heard: "Officers, report..."

We were on a long-range cruise then and the executive officer had much to do, of course. He responded sharply to changes in the situation and determined the new approaches to them. Nonetheless, Capt-Lt V. Molochayev was clearly infatuated with calling large groups of officers to a state-room, the bridge, the helicopter landing area, and -- most often -- the wardroom. In terms of time these operations meetings dragged on as long as service meetings on occasion, but the content was rarely sufficient. The executive officer repeated the same instructions over and over, it seemed, and monotonously reproached individuals for mistakes. The officers knew in advance that the next monolog by the executive officer would have "a little of everything."

Let us note that Capt-Lt V. Molochayev is a very energetic and intelligent officer who cares about his assigned work and is respected by the crew. The staff officers and school teachers who served temporarily on the ship liked him. But then his passion for operations meetings and the excess of calls and "punishment" began to be noticed even by those most favorably disposed to him. By mid-cruise, it is true, the executive officer had begun holding less frequent, but more productive meetings for officers (perhaps one of his superiors suggested something).

One cannot say, of course, that service meetings are not correct and useful. It is clear to all that they are an inevitable element of any administrative activity and may differ greatly. Therefore, even the most ardent supporter of such meetings would probably find it hard to give an exact and exhaustive definition of this concept. Giving instructions and assignments is not precluded, but the service meeting ordinarily refers primarily to exchange of opinions and joint discussion of problems leading to the best decision. After all, the Russian word "soveshchat'sya" [the source of the word for "meeting"] means "to discuss together."

Unfortunately, rhetoric prevails at some meetings and no attempt is made to identify leading know-how, in particular by exchange of opinions. Meetings are occasionally elevated to the rank of a kind of universal means of control. Their educational and informative value is by no means always well thought out.

I would like to compare two neighboring military collectives in this respect.

In the subunit commanded by officer M. Bulgakov meetings are infrequent and always have a specific occasion and precise service and training goals. With this creative orientation the discussion has become a step toward growth and enrichment with new know-how for all attending the meetings.

For example, we may recall the time when they began studying and introducing the new combined arms regulations. Officer M. Bulgakov familiarized himself with them earlier than others, invited the officers to his room, and began a talk about the fundamental characteristics of the requirements of the new regulations. Then the commander consulted with the officers concerning methods of fully introducing the requirements of the regulations into life. A plan of work was drawn up. The commander watched regularly to see that the process of technical and moral training was corrected according to the new regulation requirements. As work progressed he offered suggestions and assistance. And when the revised shape of things was more or less clear he assembled the officers again. Each officer reported on how his plan was being fulfilled.

With a thorough knowledge of the situation the commander summarized all the good things, gave advice on how to reinforce and develop these factors, and figured out the reasons for mistakes. Specifically, he held Capt-Lt V. Ryumin, who had done a great deal to consolidate regulation order, up as an example. He gave a strict warning to Capt-Lt V. Kotel'nikov, who had failed to show initiative in establishing regulation principles in his assigned sector. The administrative officer in charge of logistical support for the plan received specific criticisms.

That is how the commander polished military order all year, in a planned and business-like manner, in the spirit of the requirements of the new regulations. The meetings were helpful in this. They were not frequent, but every one had reliable preliminary and subsequent checks. At them one always sensed the exact dimensions of the subject, opinions and counter proposals by the officers were given and summarized, and there was combined searching for the best ways and means to stabilize success in training and service.

It was not always that way with the neighboring subunit. I recall a talk with political worker A. Korovin. "It's true, Bulgakov has better order, even in the little things," Aleksandr Mikhaylovch admitted. "They do any job without strain and problems. Bulgakov's assemblies and formations are worked out as hours. But with us, as you see, these topics take whole meetings. It's not good."

It was not accidental that he mentioned assemblies and meetings. At that very time the senior officer had unexpectedly told him to call in all the off-duty officers and warrant officers from their homes. It was quite a job for officer A. Luk'yanov to see that they were assembled. One man had changed apartments without telling anyone while another was out somewhere, and so on.

Yes, it took them a whole series of meetings then. One session lasted from the noon meal until supertime, and supper even had to be set back 60-90 minutes. Of course they reviewed concrete facts, but they were mostly negative ones. The meeting might have been called a discussion of the results of inactivity. The senior officer spoke and then his statements were repeated by officer A. Luk'yanov. Many old instructions were repeated: it was time, they said, to be more precise in fulfilling commands for assemblies and formations, to visit the training offices more conscientiously, to fulfill cleanup schedules better. Then talk moved to preparing firefighting instructions, reporting information on new officers, on standing extra duty as a support officer (for the more experienced officers). In short, it was a typical meeting with "a little of everything."

But we assume that it is the result that is important, finally.

Roughly 1-1.5 months after this long meeting we followed up some of the points discussed. We were sorry to learn that the situation had not improved at all in many respects. While attendance at the fire office became more regular, even before the meeting the senior officer had bolstered personal checks on the work of the office. And little had changed as to attendance at other offices, for example the drill station. Instructor Warrant Officer V. Moiseyev and I found significant violations of the drill schedule and requirements for preparation for watch.

In short, the meeting we mentioned above was a sample of the disproportion between the abundance of instruction and much more modest checks.

It is thus a matter of the effectiveness of the meetings. Experience teaches us that the least useful meetings are those inspired by the odd habit of "calling everyone in" at the first sign of rough spots in the work. The psychological habit is understandable: nothing is easier than to "push a button." But it is not always the most effective way. Such meetings, like a mediocre "dressing down," are reliable signs of errors in leadership style, and they have certain moral consequences. They are especially ineffective when they are not backed up by organizational and educational work and strict checks on fulfillment of instructions and recommendations given earlier.

Many such meetings are held precisely because, owing to poor checks, earlier instructions and recommendations were not carried out. How can one help recalling the words spoken from the podium of the 25th CPSU Congress concerning the incorrect practice of adopting more and more new resolutions on the same old subject when earlier resolutions were not carried out or were carried out inaccurately and incompletely precisely because of poor checks.

Now, when we are facing the challenges of a new training year, it seems to me it would be useful to analyze the effectiveness of meetings held in the past year and determine how well-thought out the subjects were and whether the time spent on the meetings was recouped in practice. Some thought should be given to the best ways to manage this form of leadership within the limitations of the daily schedule, the concrete purpose, and the composition of the audience, and how to insure precise checks on progressive know-how revealed at the meetings and on performance of instructions and orders. In the end, these are all components of the scientific organization of military labor, of the effectiveness and quality of this labor.

One of the military pedagogs once advised that we think over the question: what can the soldier not be taught. In our case, perhaps we should consider: what things do not need to be discussed at such a meeting? Are there adequate grounds to hold it at all?

11,176
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PILOT, NAVIGATOR RATINGS: SUBJECT FOR SPECIAL EMPHASIS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Dec 76 p 1

[Lead editorial: "Pilot Ratings"]

[Text] The personnel of the Air Force and the aviation of the Air Defense Forces and Navy have moved forward at a rapid rate from the very first days of the new training year. Supporting the initiative of the Guards Aviation Red Guard Regiment imeni 50-letiya SSSR our military aviators have become actively involved in socialist competition for high combat readiness, further improving air training, mastering new aviation equipment and weapons and preserving them, good performance of combat and political training, exemplary military order, and proper celebration of the 60th anniversary of Great October.

Raising rating qualifications is an important task in the combat training of aviators. Highly rated airmen are usually masters of using the aircraft in battle who are capable of carrying out flight assignments under the most complex tactical and weather conditions, at any time of the day or night. It is the natural aspiration of every pilot to reach that level of skill. This is reflected in the socialist obligations of flight personnel. The young pilots, flight school graduates, set their goal for the training year at achieving the rank of military pilot (or navigator) 3rd class, while experienced aviators set goals of earning high ratings or confirming them.

Success in fulfilling the plan and socialist obligations for increasing ratings depends first of all on the organizational work of the commanders, staffs, and political agencies and on the level of methodological preparation of instructors and skillful use of progressive know-how in improving flight-tactical skills. For example, practice fully confirms the effectiveness of the group method of raising the ratings of flight personnel. Leading units and subunits of aviation in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Far East, Turkestan, and other military districts, and other groups of forces and fleets have achieved stable rates of growth in airmen's ratings by using this method. They have accumulated valuable experience which contains much that is instructive, and hard work is needed everywhere to put it into practice in the new training year.

In those places where they try to work in the old way -- where they do not take account of the local weather conditions, do not use the advantages of the group method of drilling aviators at airfields with appropriate weather conditions, and do not work at selecting instructors and aviation mechanics -- the time required to prepare some pilots and navigators for ratings drags out inexcusably. In the regiment commanded by Lt Col N. Yur'yev, for example, each year certain pilots do not fulfill the obligations to raise their ratings, even though all necessary conditions are present.

Long years of experience demonstrate convincingly that the largest part of flight work to raise aviation ratings is done during the winter in the leading units. In most regions this is the time of difficult weather conditions. Therefore, the winter period of combat work should become decisive in achieving planned programs and obligations for growth in the ratings of aviators. The job of the commanders, staffs, and political agencies is to organize the training process and management of socialist competition in such a way that maximum advantage is taken of the possibilities of new aviation equipment, the methodological skill of teachers, and characteristics of climatic conditions to improve the flight and tactical training of the aerial fighters.

It is also necessary to improve the group method of raising rating qualifications. To do this we must involve the most experienced instructors, hold special-purpose flights regularly, and make extensive use of airfield maneuvering. Because such flights take place in complex meteorological conditions, at night, and in minimum weather, special attention during preparation must be devoted to organizing training periods and to the quality of preflight drills. Therefore, multipurpose pilot and navigator trainers should be maintained in good condition at all times so they can be used fully. The number of hours of "flying time" on them should be increased where the pilot or navigator has less experience flying in clouds.

Personnel drills on instrument flight should be conducted systematically, by plan, throughout the year. Successful performance of test flights to raise rating qualifications does not at all mean that such drills can be stopped for a time. Even more or less extended interruptions are intolerable, for the crew might lose its skills in flying at night and in clouds. During both the period of preparation for the rating examination and when maintaining the conditioning of flight personnel at a constant level there must be regularly planned exercises to improve technique in instrument flight; these should be done in a closed cockpit.

To continue raising the quality of the aviators' air training we must increase the role and responsibility of the irregular qualifications commissions which are supposed to show high standards and demands with respect to precise performance of flight assignments and pilots and navigators' knowledge of engineering, aerodynamics, and tactics, as well as the discipline of the aerial fighter. Members of the commissions must

make broader use of the right to selective checks of aviator training in order to eliminate cases where their level of training does not correspond to their rating. Formalism, indulgence, and simplification are intolerable here.

Political agencies and party organizations are expected to devote daily attention to seeing that communists play a leading part in the competition to raising ratings. It is important for flights in the most complex tactical and meteorological conditions to be a real school for raising professional skill and actively foster the development of lofty moral-political and psychological traits in aviators. All forms and methods of party political work must be used to instill in personnel persistence and purposefulness in striving to reach the planned goals of socialist competition.

Our modern aviation complexes are in reliable hands. The pilots and navigators of the Air Force and Air Defense and Navy aviation are deeply aware of the challenges which follow for them from the decisions of the 25th party congress and the October 1976 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. They are working hard to improve their combat skill and watch the skies of our native land vigilantly.

11,176
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MILITARY APPLICATION OF FIBER OPTICS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Dec 76 p 3

[Article by A. Markaryan: "Light Which Flies Along Wires"]

[Text] Fiber optics is a comparatively young area of science and technology. It first appeared in the 1950's. The journal ELECTRONICS INTERNATIONAL reports that extensive research was initiated abroad at that time to search for possible applications of light conductors, chiefly in military aviation, shipbuilding, in communications equipment and operational reconnaissance.

The physical essence of the phenomena utilized in fiber optics is quite simple: if light rays strike the end of a fiber or rod of a highly-transparent dielectric at a certain angle, full internal reflection occurs on the lateral walls, and the light rays emerge from the opposite end. Bunched light-conducting fibers of this kind are capable of transmitting light and optical images great distances. The light conductor can be flexed and curved, just as the conventional copper cable. In other words light, which propagates in a straight line, as we know, can now be transmitted along lines of any configuration, just like an electrical signal. A fiber optics light conductor with polished ends is thus transformed into a unique "flexible lens" up to 5-10 kilometers in length. What advantages does this provide?

Foreign military experts note that, in comparison with wire and cable systems, light-guides contain considerably greater communications channel information capacity and, what is most important, a high degree of secrecy of transmission. They are not sensitive to electromagnetic interference and therefore do not require shielding or grounding. In addition, light-conducting systems are considerably lighter in weight and smaller in size. Since the light conductors themselves are dielectrics, there can be no short circuits, that is, they possess a high degree of electrical reliability. Their resistance to interference is so great that, as experts have calculated,

Based on materials appearing in foreign publications.

transmission of the entire text of the Encyclopaedia Britannica 18 times in succession would contain distortion of only one word.

The successes achieved in the area of practical application of fiber optics, states the journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, have aroused the interest primarily of specialists in military aviation. Aircraft fiber-optics communications systems make it possible, in the opinion of foreign designers, to produce highly economical, performance-flexible, small, lightweight and low-cost control systems.

One should note, the journal emphasizes, that for military aircraft purchased by the U.S. Government from private companies there exists a direct relationship between an aircraft's cost and its weight. On the average a combat aircraft costs the U.S. Government 880 dollars per kilogram. Weight savings by replacing, for example, conventional cables with fiber optics in the navigation and weapon control systems of the modern fighter aircraft is estimated at 32 kg. This makes it possible to reduce the cost of each aircraft by 70,000 dollars. In addition, the specific characteristics of light conductors, the experts claim, make aircraft and aircraft weapons control systems insensitive to lightning flashes and other atmospheric disturbances, as well as, for example, to radiation produced by nuclear bursts.

Judging by reports in foreign publications, the insensitivity of light conductors to electromagnetic disturbances has particularly aroused the interest of naval experts. Encountering the problem of strong electromagnetic fields occurring on board submarines due to the fact that they are densely packed with electrical equipment, they have turned to the utilization of light-guides in naval instrument engineering. It is now being claimed that fiber optics will totally replace submarine periscope structures, various optical sights and communications gear with fixed sonar stations, ASW buoys or mine-sweeping devices. Some experimental models of video telephone communications and television systems are already being tested by U.S. naval experts.

It has been reported in foreign publications that specialists in other areas of military technology are also focusing their attention on fiber optics. It is proposed, in particular, to utilize an optical cable for internal communications in shelters, at command posts, as well as for communications between subunits at the battalion level -- with lightguide lengths of up to 8 km.

Technical diagnostic instruments have been developed abroad on the basis of fiber optics techniques. The journal COMPUTER DESIGN says that they operate on the following principle: light is transmitted down one lightguide into difficult-access areas of machinery, while a second lightguide serves as a unique window through which one can visually inspect the internal condition or determine the cause of failure.

Finally, we should mention that fiber optics offers the capability to transmit not only images of objects but also signals of any types -- digital, alphanumeric, etc. Engineers abroad are planning to make use of this property to

design on the basis of light conductors new types of integrated circuits and computer memory logic elements. In brief, today, according to foreign publications, the search for ways to utilize fiber optics is being conducted in practically all U.S. establishments connected with the development of military equipment and weapons.

In the opinion of many foreign military experts, fiber optics is capable already today of offering a number of important advantages in the design of weapons and military equipment. An even brighter future is predicted.

3024

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ACTIONS TAKEN ON READERS' COMPLAINTS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Dec 76 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Measures Taken on Reader Warnings"]

[Text] "Living conditions are poor here," wrote Sr Lts A. Gerasimov, O. Onashvili and others to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. "Nor are we receiving our proper pay and allowances. Our workday is poorly organized, and there is no vehicle transportation available for visiting our families on days off."

A check verified that the facts as listed in the letter were correct. Measures have been taken to correct the deficiencies noted.

The officers' workday is now better organized, and they are being paid the proper pay and allowances. Vehicle transportation is available for visiting their families.

Officer V. Popov has been disciplined by the military and by the party for failure to provide proper living conditions for the officers and warrant officers. Officer A. Kozachuk has been removed from his job and has been meted severe party punishment for an irresponsible attitude toward his duties and for lack of concern for his men.

"I was inducted into active military service, but they refused to take our child at the nursery school," stated Pvt S. Burdyuk in a letter to the editors. The editors wrote the executive committee of the Abay city soviet. A reply was received, stating that the soldier's child had been enrolled in the nursery school.

"I did a good job in the service, and now that I have been discharged into the reserves and need a reference in order to get a job with the police, suddenly it turns out that I was negligent and remiss as a sergeant," wrote Sr Sgt (Res) A. Studnev. The editors forwarded his letter to the appropriate political officer. We have been informed by Colonel Prigolovkin that Studnev was given a bad recommendation due to the fault of Warrant Officer V. Levchenko. The error has been corrected, and Warrant Officer Levchenko has been disciplined.

Retired colonel M. Gorb requested the Babushkinskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in the city of Moscow for military travel documents. Instead of help he received abuse from Soviet Army civilian employee V. Nekrasov. Gorb informed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of this. His letter was verified by personnel of the Moscow City Military Commissariat Political Section. Soviet Army civilian employee Nekrasov has been fired. Measures have been taken to prevent the occurrence of such incidents.

"There is a pretty good PX on our base, but the sales clerks frequently short-weight customers," reader G. Artemova wrote the editors.

We have been informed by Col D. Voron'ko, trade directorate chief of the Baltic Military District, that a special commission was set up to verify the contents of this letter. The complaint was confirmed to be valid.

PX manager G. Sergiyenko has been fired for violation of Soviet trade regulations.

3024

CSO: 1801

PRIVATE VEHICLES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL CREATING PROBLEMS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by Col Justice I. Gordiyenko: "A Place for Zhigulis"]

[Text] There were more and more privately-owned automobiles around the building where Sr Lt I. Komarenko resides. They were parked haphazardly everywhere -- in the courtyard, in the entrance driveway, on the lawns under the windows. The "wheelless" segment of the tenants were understandably indignant: there was less and less room available for the children to play in, and there were oil drippings and dirty rags all over the place. At this time Kramarenko was notified by the car dealer: Come on in and take delivery on your new car.

In order to avoid the unpleasantnesses which attended the other car owners, the lieutenant requested Maj I. Lopatin for permission to put up a metal garage in the unit area. Permission was granted, with a specific site indicated -- on a vacant site next to the obstacle course, but the major was in violation of the law with this permission. Just as the garage was almost completed, it had to be taken down. Why?

Article 12 of the Basic Land Law of the USSR and the Union Republics states that enterprises, organizations and establishments may not grant secondary land utilization of land assigned to their use. That is, no nonmilitary structures may be erected, including garages for privately-owned automobiles, on land assigned for the use of a military unit.

But what is Senior Lieutenant Kramarenko supposed to do with his expensive purchase? Does the law really leave him in the lurch with his predicament? And he is not the only one. Every year there are more and more automobiles privately owned by officers, warrant officers, and civilian employees of the Soviet Army and Navy. Can their justified requests for a place to park their cars be rejected?

Our laws provide for a solution to this problem. It is only a pity that some Zhiguli and Moskvich owners, as many commanding officers, are not taking steps to find a place to park privately-owned automobiles in conformity with the provisions of the law.

Officers of another unit -- Majs I. Khokhlov, G. Vorob'yev and their comrades -- experienced the same inconveniences encountered by Senior Lieutenant Kramarenko. But then a meeting of army personnel owning automobiles decided to organize a cooperative and submitted a request to the city executive committee for a permit to put up a collective garage. The unit's commanding officer and political worker showed an interest in the project. A garage was erected on the site allocated by the executive committee.

But what if conditions of a unit's location are such that it is impossible to build a garage close to it? There is a solution available: a military unit, as a land user, is entitled to build an open parking lot on the post. Construction is financed with funds allocated to the unit for major repairs on buildings and other structures. Automobile owners pay a rental fee for use of the parking lot. In those units whose commanding officers have been attentive to the needs of their men, these parking lots offer numerous conveniences to car owners: engine preheating in winter, car washing, and battery charging.

As we have seen, however, the procedure specified by law is not always observed. It was suggested to Kramarenko that he build his own garage. In some units open parking spaces have been arbitrarily covered over: metal garages have been erected, and sometimes on concrete foundations. Cellars and grease pits are added to these garages. There are instances where car parking facilities are utilized by citizens not connected with the military unit. Frequently standard parking facility equipment plans are not followed, which detracts from the esthetic appearance of military posts. Many units have not yet settled the matter of payment for the use of parking places. As a result the state does not receive money due it, and car owners are deprived of needed conveniences.

Unfortunately some commanders and political workers have not yet recognized the importance of this problem. And yet its resolution in conformity with Soviet laws not only improves conditions for officers and warrant officers but also helps improve traffic safety on our roads.

The "Principal Directions of Development of the USSR Economy in 1976-1980" specify further development of cooperative garages and parking lots for privately-owned vehicles. In the army and navy this point is reflected in special legal enactments. Both commanding officers and vehicle owners should act in conformity with these laws.

3024
CSO: 1801

HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS GUNNERY TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Dec 76 p 1

[Article by Capt V. Elizbarashvili: "Helicopters Attacking"]

[Text] Helicopter gunships, hugging the rust-colored mountains and blending indistinguishable into this background, swiftly advance toward the tanks. The "aggressor," bringing reserves up from the rear, intends to mount a sudden attack on ground troops. It is the helicopters' mission to thwart this plan.

Sr Lt Viktor Tomkevich bent down to the sight hood. As soon as a tank silhouette appeared in his view, he pressed the firing button. A sharp report followed. A pale lightning flash obscured the panoramic sight from the oblique. The missile was on its way. The bright spot produced by the tracer compound was now in the center of view.

The officer watched as the antitank missile swiftly approached the tank. He knew that it would be a hit. It was -- sparks flashed below the turret on the lead tank. The armored vehicle was soon enveloped in clouds of black smoke.

At that moment another AT missile flashed by on the helicopter's right. Tomkevich followed its flight. The projectile soared upward, then downward, yawing from side to side, as if it were selecting a suitable victim. Failing to find a target, it nosed down sharply and bored into a cliff....

The helicopters landed to refuel and reload. Senior Lieutenant Tomkevich tried to keep a watchful eye on the ground crew, but he kept wondering: who of his comrades had just missed? Too bad he had not noticed the identification number on the helicopter in No 2 position toward the target. The crew commander diverted his attention -- when the missile smashed into the cliff, he commented: "Somebody's nerves failed him...."

At the time Tomkevich squirmed uncomfortably in his seat, as if the comment applied to him. Probably because he himself had been a bit nervous the first few seconds after firing: what if the missile went wild? But he had hit his tank. But the man on the right had not. Had he been too rushed?

Perhaps that was it. The second helicopter crew had fired at a closer range. In such a case the operator must act particularly fast and precisely, and his visual judgment must be particularly flawless.

The reason for his comrade's failure was determined. Tomkevich would be praised at the critique, for today he had won the socialist competition, accurately scoring hits on all targets. But the lead can be lost. The gunnery problems were becoming more complicated. They would be firing at the closest allowable range. In such a configuration he did not have much confidence. But he should have.

Thinking about this, Tomkevich became increasingly disturbed. Where is the guarantee of accurate missile firings? Recently an engineer had explained to them the procedures for adjusting the equipment and had given them interesting recommendations. He should give it a try.

On the second mission Sr Lt V. Tomkevich, when the gunnery range's familiar mountain plateau hove into view, asked the pilot to approach closer to the target. The pilot agreed, but then, as the tank silhouettes were looming larger and larger, he asked in alarm: "What are you waiting for?"

"Just a little bit more.... Fire!"

The familiar slapping report. The missile, piercing the bluish haze, smacked into the tank.

"What a sharpshooter!" the pilot exclaimed. On their return, the squadron commander congratulated Tomkevich.

This was not the first time. Sr Lt Viktor Tomkevich was considered one of the top operators for good reason. Striving to master the helicopter gunship weapons as thoroughly as possible, he would listen to the advice of engineers and technicians, day after day improving his knowledge and practical skills. The result was that Tomkevich as a rule would hit armored targets with the first missile. He made no secret about how he had acquired his skill and was quite happy to teach his techniques to others.

He taught others without the slightest bit of superior attitude; he knew how to approach people in order not to injure their pride. People are quite different not only in ability but also in character and personality. They respond differently to success and failure. One must clearly sense this in order not to lose the most important thing in relations between teacher and pupil -- mutual understanding.

Senior Lieutenant Tomkevich was waiting in front of the mess hall for somebody. "Who are you waiting for?" asked Sr Lt Aleksey Dubina, Tomkevich's rival in socialist competition.

"I've got something to tell you," replied Viktor, taking Aleksey by the arm and leading him off to the side.

Tomkevich excitedly told him about something he had realized on his last target run. Aleksey listened attentively: something he had been vaguely guessing at was now verified and precise. "So that's why it sometimes didn't work.... Now everything is clear," he exclaimed enthusiastically to Viktor Tomkevich.

At the preliminary training drill the officers rechecked their figures. Following the next training mission to the gunnery range both checked results with satisfaction. They were pleasing results; both received a high mark.

3024

CSO: 1801

IRREGULARITIES IN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION UNIT DISCUSSED

Moscow. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Dec 76 p 2

[Article by Col (Res) V. Arkhipov: "In a Rush Atmosphere"]

[Text] I was compelled to seek an appointment to see Lt Col Yakov Yevdokimovich Kavtashkin by a letter sent to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from the military construction detachment under his command. The letter was written with a directness characteristic of the military man and, it seemed, did not indicate a painstaking verification. Everything seemed to lie at the surface. But once one read through the entire letter, questions seemed to rise up from between the lines, questions which at first glance seemed naive, but in actuality were not that simple: is it advisable for an officer to spend from 12 to 13 hours every day in his subunit? Does an officer or warrant officer have the right to count on a real day off? Should an officer be criticized in the presence of his men? One can easily and immediately answer questions of this kind: it is not advisable. He is entitled, he should not, etc. But something compelled the writer to pose these questions!

Learning of the letter to the editors, Yakov Yevdokimovich frowned. His no longer young face took on a stern expression. When he himself read the typed letter, he could not hold back a smile: "I was thinking, God knows what they have come up with here, but this is nothing but trivia. We have people who would rather sleep more and work less. A sensible officer, a diligent warrant officer does not shy away from difficulties and does not get involved in petty intrigues. Talk to them and you'll see!"

The lieutenant colonel immediately ordered four men in for an interview, apparently of the "intelligent and diligent" group. They included an acting company commander, company deputy commander for political affairs, company deputy commander for technical affairs, and a platoon leader. They failed to live up to Yakov Yevdokimovich's expectations, however. They all turned out to be personally interested in resolving those questions which had been brought up in the letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. They related in detail why these questions had arisen.

The officers' and warrant officers' quarters were situated 6 kilometers from the headquarters and barracks of the military construction unit. There was no public transportation between the two locations. This gave Lieutenant Colonel Kavtaskin the opportunity to establish an excessively long work day for his officers and warrant officers. In the spring, summer and fall the vehicle assigned by the unit's commanding officer would take them to the barracks at 0630 hours and would return them after 2000 hours. Now that it was winter, the vehicle would show up at their quarters an hour later in the morning. But the work day, subtracting a 1-hour lunch break, still ran more than 11 and a half hours.

After the officers would leave for home, Capt A. Alekseyenko, the unit's executive officer, would remain in his office for quite some time. He works not only with papers but also with people. If he recalled that during the day he had forgotten to give somebody some instructions, he would immediately send out an orderly to bring him in, although the matter would not be of an urgent nature and could wait until the following day. Sometimes he would call in an officer without any need whatsoever. Once he felt that Lt A. Morozov had gone home before 2000 hours, and he ordered him summoned to headquarters immediately. When the out-of-breath lieutenant reminded him that he had come off duty only 3 hours previously and had scarcely dozed off after 24 hours without sleep, Alekseyenko graciously permitted him to go back home and catch up on his sleep.

Groundless summonses of this kind are no rarity in this unit. Not long ago the executive officer set up a meeting with his officers and warrant officers for 2130 hours, as if there was no time to do it during the day. The executive officer addressed the meeting: "Have you forgotten that there is an inspection parade tomorrow? Am I going to have to polish your brass for you?" Many of the men simply could not comprehend why they had been called to a meeting. They had been informed of the forthcoming inspection 2 days in advance and had endeavored to make use of this time to prepare for it. It is true that in one of the companies uniforms were not yet completely inspection-ready, but this was being taken care of right then by a 1st sergeant who had remained in the barracks for the evening. It was too late to make any other preparations for the inspection.

This is the picture which materializes upon elucidation of the reasons behind the first question. Now for the second question. It is difficult to comprehend the reasoning behind Lieutenant Colonel Kavtaskin's decision on adopting his own system of granting days off to his officers and warrant officers. The enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers in the unit have Sunday off, as is customary. But the officers and warrant officers, on Kavtaskin's orders, must report for duty in the barracks on Sunday with the enlisted personnel, who are off duty. In exchange, each officer and warrant officer was entitled during the course of the following week to request that his immediate superior give him a day off. If there are no urgent matters pending, the immediate superior can give his subordinate permission to "take a day off." But he can also refuse permission, because there is always plenty of work pending.

It is this type of requested day off which is called "not a real day off" in this unit. They can only dream about a real day off, which can be planned in advance -- such as buying theater tickets in advance, etc.

Yakov Yevdokimovich himself gave us the answer to the third question. Seeing that the men who had been summoned at his own choice did not agree with his assessment of the strange procedures introduced in the unit, he flew into a rage.

As soon as Yakov Yevdokimovich loses full control of himself, his language becomes unusually flowery, like a Turkish rug. It is true that every line and swirl on a rug is in conformity with artistic standards. Yakov Yevdokimovich at times bends such a "swirl" so much that it simply cannot be reproduced on paper. Some have become accustomed to the peculiarities of Lt Col Ya. Kavtaskin's speech and tolerate it, while others take offense, particularly when the "chewing out" takes place in the presence of subordinates.

Having grown accustomed to doing everything his own way, Yakov Yevdokimovich ceased distinguishing lawful actions from autocratic rule. Take the following example. There is no Voyentorg mess at the unit, and it would be inexpedient to have one. The officers and warrant officers requested that the unit commanding officer assign a vehicle which would take them home for lunch. Lieutenant Colonel Kavtaskin turned down this legitimate request, although he could have approved it. But since people have to eat somewhere, he ordered the enlisted men's mess to give all officers and warrant officers free lunches, which is clearly illegal.

An overly-long workday and confusion about granting days off are beneficial to nobody, and the harm they produce is obvious. I asked many of the officers and warrant officers what books they had read in the last year. Every one of them raised his eyebrows in surprise. Nobody had read a single book or had gone to the theater a single time during the past year. "I hardly have time to look through the newspapers, let alone reading imaginative literature," one of the officers complained. All this holds back the ideological and cultural growth of the officers and warrant officers, which cannot help be reflected in the quality of indoctrinational work with military construction personnel.

One readily notes that the main reason for serious deficiencies in organization of service here was the rude violation of military regulations. In any unit the executive officer is one of the most vigorous champions of adherence to regulations. In this unit the executive officer, Captain Alekseyenko, unfortunately is not such an individual.

It has long since been proven that violation of regulations does not go unheeded. Everybody seems loaded down with work, not getting enough sleep, busy from morning to night, and things move slowly. All this happens because bustle is by no means an indicator of full employment of work time. It is more frequently an indicator of lack of organization.

Lieutenant Colonel Kavtaskin and his executive officer ignore important items in the daily bustle. For example, if they found the time to analyze disciplinary practice, they would have long ago noted that remission of punishment has long since become practically the main form of reward and encouragement for officers and warrant officers in this unit. An objective analysis would help establish that in order to increase the effectiveness of officer labor it is necessary to organize the work day more efficiently, not to increase its length.

He who chooses the profession of military officer is certainly not counting on an easy life. He knows that the service may send him beyond the Arctic Circle or into the broiling desert. They may roust him out of bed at midnight and put him out on the road in rain and snow. Nor is he frightened by the burdens and inevitable difficulties of military service. But what if difficulties arise due to lack of organization and autocratic rule? Does it make sense to accept such a situation? It does not! We cannot forgive those who artificially create these difficulties, no matter how noble the intentions with which they cover themselves.

3024

CSO: 1801

IMPORTANT STEPS TO PRECISE, UNINTERRUPTED FLIGHT CONTROL DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Col V. Uryuzhnikov, military pilot 1st class, candidate of military sciences, docent: "In a Complex Situation -- New Weapons and Tactics"]

[Text] During exercises the group of fighters headed by Maj Yu. Rykov was providing air cover above the field of battle for motorized rifle subunits. The control post on board the lead plane announced the approach of an airborne enemy. From this moment on time was counted in seconds. Actions had to be vigorous and determined to drive off the attack.

It seemed that the situation itself was favorable. The lead plane got information on the enemy ahead of time. The conditions for visual searching were excellent: a clean, clear sky. Moreover, Rykov knew the opponents against whom he and his wingman were being tested: fighters under the command of Maj S. Logvinenko, commander of the neighboring squadron. The pilots of this subunit were acting as the air enemy in these exercises.

But events during the battle did not develop at all as Major Rykov had assumed. At first control from the ground was stable. But then the enemy began jamming. The lead plane did not hear one of the commands. And then the wingman-pilot said by radio: "I see a group of aircraft." Such an indefinite report naturally puzzled Rykov. He demanded a better description of the target and the direction and distance to it. At last, more exact information on the air enemy was received.

But visual searching in the indicated direction was complicated by the blinding sun and the lead plane did not make out the battle formation of fighters right away. And while he tried to clarify the situation that had taken shape Major Logvinenko's group was rushing to the attack. Thus the battle began under tactically disadvantageous conditions for Rykov's wingmen. They had to defend themselves. While under attack, it is true, they tried to use their group flying experience and teamwork

to turn the battle in their favor. But they failed, and essentially lost the battle. What was the reason?

It is obvious that no unambiguous answer can be found. All the same, when analyzing the actions of Major Rykov's wingmen it is easy to see that there were breakdowns in the overall chain of fighter control, and they were breakdowns in the key links.

It began with the indecisiveness of the commander who was controlling the battle from the command post: he did not switch control of the fighter group to another post, even though he certainly knew that radio communication gets worse further from a ground radio station, especially when flying at low altitude. That was why Major Rykov did not hear one of the commands. If he had received it and carried it out, the pilots of the group he was leading would have had better conditions in searching for the target. Moreover, he, the commander, would have had a full chance to evaluate the situation on time in order to drive off the attack without delay.

What could the lead plane have done to restore communication. Increase altitude on his own decision? That would have been a violation of the conditions of the assignment. In that case the ground radar of the enemy would have detected the fighters immediately. Major Rykov was well aware of this danger and did not risk being discovered.

This means that the situation itself dictated the necessity to switch control of the fighters to another post, which would have insured reliable, uninterrupted communication. High demands have always been made of control in battle. This factor, of course, becomes even more important with increasing speeds and lower flight altitudes.

The indefiniteness of the report by the wingman who first spotted the target also let the commander down. During the time required for the lead plane to get additional information on the air enemy, the latter detected the fighters and prepared to attack them. What was needed was a precise, concrete report on the target, which would undoubtedly have given the commander time to make a plan for battle.

So it turned out that insignificant "hitches" in control led to loss of the initiative and the tactical advantage in aerial battle. What if this had happened in a real combat situation? It is not impossible that the mistakes mentioned above would have had grave consequences.

Modern warfare is highly dynamic, with sudden, abrupt changes in the situation. When coordinating the actions of subordinates in the interests of successful performance of the mission, the commander must take into account not only the increased complexity of the combat equipment and the capabilities of automated control systems, but also the psycho-physiological strain on the men under conditions of acute time shortage. It is important here to make advance provision for variations of the

control system in order to insure precise, uninterrupted communication between the flight control teams and the crews in the air in any situation, even the most unexpected.

The requirements of continuity and firmness of control have grown especially today, when the operating range of aircraft has greatly widened. This means that the questions of control must be approached on a strictly scientific basis, with due regard for changes in equipment and tactics and the objective rules of using aircraft in battle for performance of independent missions and in cooperation with other arms of troops. The same automated systems, for example, which greatly simplify the actions of a commander as leader in the battle formation of a group of aircraft help resolve many questions of control in a new way.

But the most unexpected situations are possible in the dynamics of modern battle. Therefore, the commander must always be ready to control his subordinates in the most complex situation and work persistently to instill in them independence, battle activism, and an unbending will to victory over the enemy.

The process of controlling fighters may be arbitrarily divided into two stages: the first is from take-off until detection of the airborne enemy, and the second is from the moment of target detection until it is destroyed. In the first stage the teams at the command posts, which are carrying on guidance, have great responsibilities. But no matter how great the capabilities of ground control equipment may be, the success of group aerial battle depends primarily on the commander-leader, his tactical readiness and ability to evaluate the situation taking shape quickly and make sound plans in the interests of effectively performing the assigned missions. Where time is very short, modeling the flight assignment can be very helpful to a commander. Even before meeting the enemy, the commander, following his conception of the battle and his plan, determines the expected direction of flight of the targets, the position of the group relative to the sun and clouds, distance from the airfield, remaining fuel, and other factors. He also envisions the most purposeful procedures for searching out and detecting the air enemy and variations of the battle maneuver and control which insure tactical advantages and effective use of onboard weapons in battle.

Such a preliminary evaluation of the air situation makes it possible to reduce the time spent adopting a plan. And the plan is the basis of control in battle. Needless to say, in group flying there must also be a precisely organized system for conducting the active search for targets, using both technical equipment and human observation. This helps in timely detection of the enemy and, therefore, an unstoppable, surprise attack. Let me refer to the following example.

Capt Yu. Mamonov led his flight of fighters into the aerial battle zone. The night before he had analyzed the most likely directions from which the enemy might appear and had selected the search route in such a way as to be able to observe low-flying targets against a revealing terrain

background, from the sun side. The search procedure was practiced in detail at training periods and during simulations of the flights. And now, traveling in the battle formation of a flight of fighters, each pilot was responsible for a certain field of observation. All this helped them detect the airborne enemy at maximum distance. According to his outlined model of the battle, the commander rapidly reorganized the group's battle formation and raced toward the target from a half roll. The fighters' missile strike was sudden and deadly accurate.

Suddenness in the first attack continues to be the decisive principle in waging aerial battle. Reducing plan-adopting time gives both the lead pilot and the wingman a chance to show their military tricks and to operate boldly and swiftly. In mobile battle, however, the commander must be constantly aware of changes in the situation and make timely adaptations of the plan of battle, rapidly determine the most effective variations of his models, and redirect his subordinates. Precise, uninterrupted control of the actions of wingmen also depends greatly on the commander selecting a correct place for himself in the battle formation, and on strict compliance with radio communication rules. The battle formation should be gone through carefully while the planes are still on the ground; it should correspond fully to the mission being performed. Radio silence when flying the route and radio discipline in the air are key conditions for achieving surprise in battle.

In the dynamics of battle only precise, uninterrupted control insures the success of interaction between crews and groups of aircraft. But this is one of the important factors in victory. And because the air force commander is the lead in both training and combat flights, he can be expected to work diligently to master the art of control in any air situation, even the most complex.

11,176
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IMPROVED CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES IN BELORUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen-Engr V. Charkin, deputy commander of troops of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District in charge of construction and troop quartering: "The Policy Is Efficiency and Quality -- Employ Progressive Know-How at Every Construction Site"]

[Text] In the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th party congress Comrade L. I. Brezhnev observed that further improvement of economic management requires implementation of a uniform system of measures: improving planning; more skillful use of economic stimuli and levers; improvement in the organizational structure and methods of management (control). Implementation of party demands became the primary goal during the transition to the new conditions of planning and economic stimulation in construction work in the Belorussian Military District.

The facts show that a turn for the better is now taking place in the affairs of construction workers. The collectives of the construction directorate overfulfilled their 1976 plan for all indices. A significant advance was made in improving the technology of construction work. Together with planners and housing operations agencies we are working out new types of fully prefabricated production and service structures. Channel-less laying of grids is being introduced extensively at construction sites. Its advantages can be seen from the fact that in one year the new method of laying heat grids permitted a savings of more than 1,500 tons of cement, 185 tons of metal, and significant labor expenditures.

Here is another example of raising the labor efficiency of construction workers. Formerly customers delivered equipment to their own sites in parts, irregularly. Certain aggregate units had to be assembled from separate parts at the construction site, which took a great deal of time and impaired the quality of work. In 1975 we changed to manufacturing the assemblies and aggregate units in workshops of the UNR [work supervisor's office]. Boilers, pumping stations, ventilation units, power substations, and the like began to arrive at the sites fully assembled. This allowed a significant improvement in work quality, a

reduction in installation time, and a rise in labor productivity. Unfortunately, some customers still deliver equipment to the sites in small batches, even though the new method has proven itself.

There have been changes in estimate work and in the financing of construction sites. Before the switch to the new conditions, construction organizations were given plan assignments which envisioned a large amount of new construction but did not allocate adequate capital to finish the projects started earlier. As a result, the work supervisor's offices fulfilled their plans and received bonuses while, at the same time, construction times dragged out immoderately and the return on capital investment was unsatisfactory. But construction organizations bore almost no responsibility for this. To further economic accountability and to cut the volume of settlement documents, in 1976 we followed the know-how of the Belorussian Ministry of Industrial Construction and switched to settlement for the completed project regardless of its cost and construction time. This made it possible to insure a uniform system for formation of funds and to receive large appropriations from customers in the form of advances. This made it possible to concentrate efforts on projects being put into operation and to insure reaching the final goal -- completion of construction and turning over for use -- in shorter periods of time.

There are still frequent cases of falsification of records and overpayment to vehicle drivers and machine operators at construction sites. To some degree this abnormal phenomenon is the result of the system of wage payments for drivers and machine operators and the procedure used by work supervisor's offices and vehicle pools for settling accounts. Therefore we have worked out and instituted a new system for settlements for the work of vehicle transport and machinery which gives due regard to the concrete local conditions of their work. This system made it possible to insure profitable work by both construction workers and machine operators. The prime cost of work by machine operators went down 10 percent.

The brigade is, everyone knows, the basic element at the construction site. Improving methods of brigade work is a paramount challenge. In this we are introducing the brigade contract. In 1976 the number of brigade contracts in our region increased significantly. It is important that not only did the number of brigades rise, but also the production and economic results of their work improved and work quality rose noticeably. During 1976 130,000 rubles of above-plan profit was earned by just a few brigades.

We have introduced the method of recording and planning output in physical terms per worker in order to cut back auxiliary and unproductive jobs. This means cubic meters of bricklaying, reinforced concrete installed, and so on, not money. This method of record-keeping and planning does not include unproductive expenditures (carryovers, alterations, and the like) in output. Therefore, the result of fulfillment of the assignment in physical volumes characterizes the level of labor organization, labor productivity, worker qualifications and engineer competence, and the currency of their knowledge.

The new system helps us in many ways. But there are several other problems which must be solved in order to achieve good, stable results. One of them is that we lack adequate production backlogs, as they are called. Instead of the calculated norm of 40 percent of the sum of appropriations for the year we have no more than 8-10 percent each year. The basic reason is that construction customers want to have as much finished output as possible and do not want to even think about how matters will go in the future, thus creating additional difficulties in fulfilling the plan.

Significant difficulties also arise owing to discrepancies between turnover times established by plans for them to go into operation and the times when they are supplied with equipment, construction elements, and frequently also planning documents. This refers first of all to the customers represented by comrades Mikhaylovskiy and Skopin. While setting times for introduction of the projects, these customers do not give guarantees of timely delivery of equipment and do not set delivery dates. Then construction workers are forced to delay turning over the structures because equipment is missing.

The question of financing construction projects where settlement is made for the project as a whole has not been fully resolved. Under the new conditions construction organizations especially need advances and credit at the right time and in adequate amounts for normal construction progress. But both advances and credit today require confirmed estimate papers. The special conditions of military construction often make it impossible to receive estimate papers from planning organizations at the established time. Therefore it seems advisable to decide the question of giving advances to construction workers on the basis of the itemized list of appropriations, with refinement of the figure, where necessary, after the estimate is ratified.

Socialist competition has unfolded on a broad scale at construction sites in the district. The goals of competition are stepped-up introduction of structures and a fundamental improvement in the quality indices of construction. Construction workers are setting a course of efficiency and quality. This is the target of all the efforts of command and engineering-technical personnel and party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations today.

11,176
CSO: 1801

METHODOLOGICAL SKILL OF OFFICERS KEY TO TRAINING SUCCESS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Polyakov: "Contrasts in Methodology - the Main Things Are Effectiveness and Quality"]

[Text] Lt A. Zhukov began the period in engineering training with a quick march. It was tough for the soldiers to run across the field, which was soggy from rain and wet snow. The new ones had an especially hard time. But they tried; after all, the commander was out in front of them where the going was hardest of all. The lieutenant was indefatigable; his inputs forced the men to be constantly tense, constantly ready for battle.

"Gas!" the next command rang out.

After waiting until all the men had performed the standard, Lieutenant Zhukov ordered the platoon to stop and check how well they had done it. One could guess from the officer's face that he was not entirely satisfied. Yesterday at the training field the soldiers had performed this fairly routine standard with an outstanding mark, but not today... One man had his mask on crooked, another had the connecting hose twisted, and a third did not exhale sharply after putting on the mask. "Increase physical loads at training periods, make performance of the standards more complicated," the officer wrote in his notebook. And again they dashed forward, to a new challenge.

The main part of the training period followed the same intensive rhythm. Lieutenant Zhukov reminded his subordinates of the theoretical points of the topic under study and asked a few check questions. This did not take long, and most of the time was used for practicing procedures, performing the standards, and studying the equipment.

At the officer's command one of the sergeants emerged from formation. A few blows with the small trenching tool and the top layer of turf was turned back in the direction of the enemy. The platoon leader explained to the men in the meantime why mines should protrude above the

ground surface when laying mines in such ground: if they are set deeper the tank track will not create the necessary pressure and the mine will not go off.

The drill began. Now the soldiers themselves dug the holes, set the mines, and camouflaged them. Everything went smoothly, according to schedule. Things were moving right along. The men worked with enthusiasm and many surpassed the standards. The platoon leader and sergeants checked on their work, made remarks, and helped eliminate weaknesses. In short, although the training period was being conducted by a young officer newly arrived from military school, one could sense confidence in his actions.

What fostered this? Above all it was the officer's high level of personal responsibility, careful preparation for the training period, good material support, and, of course, proper attention to the young commander on the part of senior officers. The lieutenant studied the appropriate guiding documents thoroughly and prepared a good outline plan. The day before they went into the field the company commander, Sr Lt A. Lavrenov held an instructors training period for him and the sergeants where they practiced all the actions of the training leader and his assistants. It was also helpful that both during preparation for and conduct of the training period the young officer skillfully followed his methodological plans.

A commander's high level of methodological training is the basis of his success in technical and moral training of his subordinates. Where this is given serious attention the results are plain to see. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. This can be illustrated by an example from the airborne and water crossing company commanded by Sr Lt V. Gut'tyayev.

It cannot be said that the company did not prepare for going into the field. The amphibious personnel carriers and self-propelled tracked ferries were put in full combat readiness and the necessary stock of materiel was created. But as soon as the training period began the gaps in methodological skill of platoon leaders lieutenants V. Kosov and A. Lyasovskiy began to show. They formed up their subordinate vehicles and spent considerable time explaining platitudes to them. The soldiers stood in the cold wind, but their faces showed that they were merely bored. The platoon leaders did not keep track of correct distribution of time for practicing the training problems. This would have been difficult in any case, because the outline plans did not make provision for this. The company commander did not ratify the outlines. But it later turned out that the sergeants did not even have them.

Another shortcoming was easy to notice in the organization of training periods: there was no spirit of competition. The impression was given that the officers had not thought beforehand of how to use the mobilizing force of socialist competition. It was as if the training process and competition were separate things, but everyone knows that competition is an inalienable part of the whole process of technical and moral training.

So there we have two training periods in subunits of the same arm of troops, conducted just one day apart in time. What is the origin of the great contrast in their methodological levels and what is being done in the district to improve the methodological skill of officers?

Maj Gen Tank Trps V. Bochkovskiy, deputy troop commander in charge of combat training for the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District, had the following remarks after reading the above.

"We consider raising the methodological skill of officers to be one of the most important conditions for achieving high quality and effectiveness in the training process. The contrasts in the methodological levels of training periods still exist, unfortunately. But what is a poorly conducted training period? It is essentially a waste of precious time. The training period conducted by Lieutenant Zhukov stands out for the officer's desire to fill each training minute to the utmost. The best way to do this is to work on the questions of any discipline together with tactics, to put subordinates in a tactical situation. Ignoring these requirements leads to simplification, stereotyped actions, and indulgence in training periods. Joining training subjects is a promising line of development in combat training and we are going to strive to make maximum use of this method.

"A situation where the training leader forgets competition is absolutely intolerable. To act thus is to ignore a most important reserve for raising the effectiveness of combat training. The military council, staff, and political directorate of the district are striving to see that the officers, ensigns, and sergeants acquire the necessary skills in this work and improve their methodological abilities. The district has established fairly good physical facilities for training and we use them for methods assemblies, teaching methods and demonstration training periods, and other activities intended to give commanders at all levels progressive methodology in training personnel. It is true that there are still problems: these activities do not always go as we would like, and some of them are irregular and seasonal. In short, we still have a good deal to do to see that growth in the methodological skill of commanders, especially young ones, becomes a subject of the fixed attention of senior officers, staffs, and political agencies. This is one of the main ways to raise the combat readiness of the units and subunits and successfully accomplish the missions facing the troops of the district in this anniversary year."

11,176
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GUILTY PARTIES SHOULD REPAY STATE LOSSES FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Just N. Belikev: "Money Loves To Be Counted"]

[Text] To judge by everything, the last thing Jr Sgt I. Sarychev was thinking about when he enrolled for extended service was his future duties. Therefore, when the results of his work began to be totaled up after a short period of service in his new capacity it was easy to establish that he had received everything due him as an extended serviceman, but he was doing a poor job. And it was entirely natural that, upon considering this, the senior office decided to discharge Sarychev from the Armed Forces for lack of discipline and discrediting the title of military serviceman. The decision was carried out.

But I mentioned the duties of a serviceman and, simultaneously, his rights for a purpose. They are, after all, interrelated. Sometimes it is hard to reproach a subordinate for lack of diligence if he has not been given everything necessary to perform his duties. The other side of the coin is also natural: if everything is provided, then the person works according to conscience. This is not just a moral principle. In a number of cases the interdependence of personal rights and duties is fixed in law: if you do not want to perform your duty honorably you can be deprived of certain privileges and advantages. And this was the principle of law which was forgotten by those who carried out the order to discharge Sarychev from active extended military duty.

In accordance with established procedure, persons being discharged for such causes are to be charged the amount of the outright grant they received and the value of their uniforms proportional to the amount of time remaining until the end of the term of service (period for wearing uniforms). In the case of Sarychev this would have meant returning the amount of 572 rubles and 78 kopecks to the state. But he did not do so. Why not? Because neither Lt Col G. Bur'kov, acting unit commander at the time, nor Capt Intend Serv A. Kuzovlev, chief of the finances services, thought of it in time.

But then, one would expect that after the intervention of the military procurator's office the new unit commander would take steps to retrieve

the debt to the state. But the fact that after it was formed the debt "hung" untended for a long time indicates a careless attitude on the part of other officials with respect to preservation of state money. We should note that there have been other, similar cases in this same unit. For various reasons now-discharged citizens V. Pasechnik, I. Puchkin, S. Ayrapetyan, and others remain in debt to the state.

It is very unfortunate that officials who are "generous" with state money are not confined to this one unit. Not long ago a suitcase containing personal belongings of Pvt P. Shcheglov disappeared from the storeroom of one company. The thief was found -- an electrician from the garrison KECh [quarters operations unit] had coveted the soldier's things. A court was formed and one of its decisions was to oblige the unit responsible for the preservation of soldiers' private property to repay Shcheglov the value of the stolen goods. This was done. But then after this the amount should have been recouped from the person really guilty, the electrician. But they did not find time to do so, and again the state took the loss because of the unconscientious work of certain officials.

Thus it is relevant here to cite the principle of law which says that commanders and superiors who do not take steps to recover state losses from the persons guilty of causing these losses must themselves be held materially accountable. Probably if this principle were applied in all necessary cases there would be a few less "forgetful" and "kind-hearted" officials causing losses to the state. The thing is that definite actions usually must be taken to recover amounts for the state treasury. But there is no time for that. Another superior officer prefers to "close his eyes" to what has happened, and sometimes even sign the document writing off a certain sum of money.

I once ran into a paper in which the chief of a certain military directorate asked the finances agency to write off citizen G. Mkhitaryan's indebtedness to the state, based on an inspection certificate, because the man was "without means." In principle this can be an acceptable reason. But the debtor's insolvency must be proven, and they did not try to do this. They were simply uninterested in the true state of affairs. But the truth was that Mkhitaryan had maliciously evaded job placement and was living as a parasite, which was why he could not repay the debt. The chief should have brought him to trial, not given him encouragement in his parasitism by forgiving the loss he had caused to the state.

When I am assigned to check the state of affairs in the subunit commanded by Maj P. Fedotov, I know in advance that no such deviations from legal norms will be found there, and this includes financial affairs. This officer is able to count the people's money, as they say. And if it does happen that he does not know how to apply some legal precept, he will always consult with financial and legal experts.

Major Fedotov's work style is characterized by the following case. His subordinate Pvt P. Nazarov drove off in a motor vehicle without authorization, in a drunken condition, and caused major damage to it. The vehicle was, of course, repaired, but how were they to collect the loss caused to the state? According to existing rules a regular-term serviceman can be charged for the loss only if he has been tried in criminal court. They did not bring Nazarov to a criminal trial: no one had been injured, and the damage to the vehicle was not classified as "grave consequences." Then the unit could have closed the case, as they say.

But there was also another way: turn the necessary materials over to the people's court to recover the loss from the guilty person on the basis of civil law procedure. This is exactly what Major Fedotov did. The court decided the case in favor of the military unit, gave it a writ of execution, and ruled that the charge on it should be recovered after Nazarov had been discharged into the reserve. The money to pay for the vehicle repairs is already coming into the unit's account.

Of course, this is an exceptional case. The law does not allow a soldier or seaman to be held responsible for inexperience, for example. But when we are talking about deliberate damage to or sale of public assets, the commander must take all possible steps to see that the loss is recovered from the guilty party.

It is an important obligation of commanders and superior officers to manage public wealth properly and spend each ruble carefully. Strict compliance with ruling documents and the norms of Soviet law by every official is an important condition for fulfilling this obligation.

11,176
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PERSISTENT, IMAGINATIVE PHYSICAL TRAINING WORK IN COMPANY PAYS OFF

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 77 p 2

[Article by Guards Lt Col G. Bychkovskiy, commander of a tank regiment: "The Result Too Depends on the Approach -- Physical Training and the Military Specialization"]

[Text] The tank company commanded by Guards Sr Lt V. Martynov was outstanding at one of the tactical exercises. The same company turned up among the leaders at the next physical training inspection. Was this accidental? It certainly was not. While watching the actions of the men of the company I saw again and again that it was no particular problem for the crews to take their places in the tanks in a matter of seconds and move the weapon from traveling position to battle position in less than a minute. But these are tough standards, and meeting them is a guarantee of successful performance on complex missions.

To meet the standards dictated by modern warfare, of course, one must have a high level of moral conditioning, be strong, agile, and enduring, and show determination, stubborn persistence, and resourcefulness. And the development of these and other traits which are important for tankmen and help them fully master their battle profession is the goal of all physical education of personnel in the subunit.

The first thing one notices in attendance at physical training periods is that each category of specialist -- tank commanders, mechanic-drivers, loaders, and gunners -- drills according to a special program which takes the special features of their work into account. For example, mechanic-drivers are required to perform the assigned exercise in the gymnastics area the maximum number of times and the load is increased from one period to the next. This undoubtedly helps them handle the great physical strain which is typical of long marches.

There are other requirements for the physical training of gunners. The platoon leaders are especially anxious to see that they perform the suggested exercises precisely, quickly, and smoothly. Elements which require, for example, a quick change in direction of movement are often added to their exercise sets. In this way the gunners develop spatial orientation, which is so necessary for waging accurate fire and observing the field of battle.

We must emphasize one fact here. The company commander and other officers such as Guards Sr Lt I. Surov and Guards Lt A. Kudryashov are not only good athletes but also possess methodological knowledge. Any one of them can conduct a good training period, determine the load for each man, and work out exercise sets which take the individual characteristics of subordinates into account. This is very important, for not all tankmen arrive in the subunit with the same level of physical conditioning. Mass sports work in the company is handled skillfully. It is chiefly a supplement to physical training periods, using other means, primarily sections on applied military sports, to accomplish the same ends.

The outstanding sports facilities, built largely by the men themselves, promote the development of solid physical and volitional qualities in the men. For intensive drills they have an obstacle course, a grenade throwing trainer, long-span horizontal bars, parallel bars, a gymnastics area, and running trails. Soon they will have a special area for sambo [unarmed self-defense] training periods, trapezes with inclined ladders, and trampolines for acrobatic jumping. It is a pleasure to conduct a sports holiday with such facilities, and they have become a regular event in the company. These holidays are creatively organized and serve as excellent propaganda for physical training.

It is no accident that the men of the subunit commanded by Guards Sr Lt V. Martynov are famous for their excellent physical condition. All the men hold the VSK [Military Sports Set] medal and most are also rated sportsmen. But the main thing is that the physical and psychological traits acquired during training periods and drills in the sections and at mass competitions are a good foundation for improving combat skill and mastering complex equipment outstandingly.

But not all units have resolved the problems of physical conditioning in the way officer V. Martynov's company has. Proper attention is not given to this aspect of combat training in some subunits. Physical training periods are sometimes poorly organized. For example, how good can a drill be, how much use will the fighting man get from it, if he sees that his commander, in this case Guards Sr Lt P. Aleksandrov, cannot do the exercise on the horizontal bar or parallel bars right and is unable to demonstrate it to his subordinates? Naturally, Aleksandrov cannot evaluate whether the platoon and squad leaders prepared well from a methodological point of view. It is not accident that it is common in this subunit for men to come to the obstacle course to practice their skills in crossing it but find that there are no grenades, starting flags, or stopwatches available. Is it any surprise that this company has more physically weak men than the other companies? In fire performance too officer Aleksandrov's subordinates show poor results, and their skill level in driving tanks is not high either.

Such shortcomings cannot be tolerated. But there are problems which cannot be resolved at the regimental level. For example, some soldiers who come to us from training subunits are in such poor physical condition

that they cannot perform the simplest exercises on the equipment. For example, Guards Jr Sgt S. Kutergin, who came from the training subunit commanded by Sr Lt N. Okhokhonin, could not do a single roll mount on the horizontal bar.

Perhaps the cadets do not have appropriate conditions for physical training periods? That is not the case, not in the above-mentioned subunit nor in almost all others. They have perfectly good facilities. But a check revealed that some cadets were taken off for other work during the time assigned for physical training and there was poor control over the regularity of training periods.

Finally, one sometimes hears officers asking what to do about physical training under field conditions, where can physical training periods be conducted then? After all, there are no sports areas or gymnastic equipment.

It is true that no prepared areas are available. But if one takes the initiative it is not hard to organize physical training at tank training grounds and in the field. It should be based on running, various types of one-against-one contests, athletic games, and relay contests. Trees, logs, cables, ladders, and the like should be used to keep the training periods lively. In short, many opportunities can be found for improving the physical conditioning of the men if one wants to find them, and this is true both in the unit area and in the field.

11,176
CSO: 1801

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